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Clinical consensus and a limited number of empirical studies indicate that the 
understanding, awareness, and expression of personal emotional experiences are atypical in 
individuals with autism; however, the exact nature and magnitude of the atypicality is unclear.  
The purpose of the current study was to gain a better understanding of how individuals with 
autism understand and describe their own emotional experiences.  This study measured affective 
awareness and understanding in both the laboratory setting, and in the individual’s natural 
environment using ecological momentary assessment.  Nineteen individuals with autism (11-17 
years old) and 19 typically developing controls, matched on age and IQ, completed an in-lab task 
asking them to describe causes of their emotions in addition to self-report measures of 
depression, anxiety, social skills, and alexithymia. Their parents completed corresponding 
parent-report forms.  Following the lab visit, participants were contacted via cell phone for 14 
consecutive days and were asked to rate a subset of emotions from the PANAS-C.  
Corresponding parent reports were collected for a random subset of these days.  Results 
indicated that on the lab-based measure, the individuals with autism, in contrast to controls, had 
significantly more difficulty describing appropriate causal contexts for their self-conscious 
emotions.  When reporting on their daily levels of affect, the individuals with autism, in contrast 
to controls, reported higher intensity negative affect and more lability in positive and negative 
affect.  In comparison to parent report, there was some suggestion that the individuals with 
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 v 
autism, but not controls, were underreporting the intensity of their negative affect.  For both 
groups, intensity and lability of negative affect were related to self-reported depression 
symptoms, but not to parent reports of child depression or self- or parent-reported anxiety 
symptoms. In addition, no measures of affective awareness and understanding were related to 
child or parent reported social skills.  The current findings suggest that in adolescence, the 
manner in which individuals with autism understand, experience, and report on their emotional 
experiences differs from their typically developing peers in subtle yet notable ways.  Potential 
mechanisms underlying these differences are discussed, and a number of future directions are 
suggested. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder characterized by qualitative impairments in 
social interaction and communication, as well as the display of restricted, repetitive and 
stereotyped patterns of behavior, interests or activities (APA, 1994).  Estimated by the Centers 
for Disease Control to affect approximately one in every 110 children in the United States 
(Centers for Disease Control, 2009), as yet, autism is a disorder which cannot be prevented and 
cannot be cured.  Thus, it is imperative for researchers and clinicians alike to fully understand the 
nuances of this complex disorder in order to gain a deeper understanding of individuals with 
autism and of interventions that could aim to improve their quality of life.    
In the earliest conceptualization of the disorder, “[an] inability to form the usual, 
biologically provided affective contact with people,” was viewed as one of its primary features 
(Kanner, 1943).  Since Kanner’s first writings, numerous research studies have attempted to 
further elucidate the components of this complex syndrome.  Kanner’s original conceptualization 
has now been expanded, but “disturbances in affective contact” are still cited as a central feature 
of autistic impairment.  Hobson (1990; 2005), echoing Kanner, argues that individuals with 
autism have an “emotional deficit,” or an inability to relate affectively to others, which prevents 
them from fully grasping the concept of themselves and others as “subjects of experience” and 
ultimately contributes to a number of impairments associated with autism.  Clinicians and 
parents are also keenly aware of such difficulties, and they often report that in daily interactions, 
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some of the more prevalent social challenges faced by individuals with autism are in their 
expression and understanding of emotions (Attwood, 1998; Capps, Kasari, Yirmiya, & Sigman, 
1993; Hobson, 2004; Hobson, Chidambi, Lee, & Meyer, 2006).  
A “disturbance of affective contact” or “emotional deficit” is not explicitly listed as a key 
characteristic of any of the three current overarching diagnostic criteria of autism, but it is 
probably best encompassed under a number of symptoms that comprise “impairments in social 
interaction,” including “marked impairment in the use of nonverbal behaviors to regulate social 
interaction,” as well as “a lack of social or emotional reciprocity” (APA, 1994).  To understand 
this relatively ill-defined “emotional deficit” more clearly, however, there is utility in turning to pre-
defined models in the normative developmental literature.   
A number of skills are necessary to proficiently relate affectively to others.  The 
developmental literature suggests that in order to become an effective social-emotional partner, a 
number of abilities must be mastered and then adapted to a constantly changing social 
environment.  In effect, one must attain increasingly higher levels of affective social competence.  
Halberstadt, Denham, & Dunsmore (2001) define affective social competence (ASC) as, “the 
efficacious communication of one’s own affect, successful interpretation and response to others’ 
affective communications, and the awareness, acceptance, and management of one’s own affect” 
(pg. 80).  Thus, there are three basic components of ASC:  sending affective messages, receiving 
affective messages, and experiencing affect.  Within the three major components of affective 
social competence are four abilities, which the authors suggest develop sequentially:  awareness, 
identification, working within a social context, and management and regulation.  Halberstadt, et 
al. (2001) argue that to attain high levels of ASC, which in turn contributes to general 
proficiency in social interaction, one must become competent in all four abilities within each of 
the three components of ASC and must also be able to integrate each component effectively.  
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While typically developing children seem to acquire the skills for ASC naturally and 
apply them rather intuitively, the same cannot be said for individuals with autism.  There is little 
doubt that individuals with autism are poor social-emotional partners (Bauminger, 2002; Church, 
Alisanski, & Amanullah, 2000).  Their own emotional reactions can be unusual or inappropriate, 
and they often fail to react appropriately to the emotions of others (Attwood, 1998; Church, et 
al., 2000).  To better understand these behaviors, the ASC model provides a concrete framework 
from which to begin systematically exploring the affective difficulties in individuals with autism.   
1.1 AFFECTIVE SOCIAL COMPETENCE IN INDIVIDUALS WITH AUTISM 
To date, the majority of research on ASC skills in individuals with autism has focused on 
“sending affective messages” and “receiving affective messages,” with data indicating that they 
exhibit a variety of impairments in both of these components (for a review, see Begeer, Koot, 
Rieffe, Terwogt, & Stegge, 2008).  Remarkably little work, however, has focused on the 
“experiencing affect” component of ASC.   
 This component of the ASC model encompasses not only the awareness that one is 
experiencing affect and the ability to identify the emotion being experienced and what caused 
that emotion, but it also includes the effective regulation of one’s own emotional expression in 
the context of an ongoing social interaction (Halberstadt, et al., 2001).  It is argued that 
awareness of one’s affective state can be critical for successful social exchanges, as individuals 
who know what they are feeling are more able to verbalize what they want, indicate what their 
goals are, and negotiate conflict (Saarni, 2007).  Additionally, research demonstrates that 
children who have a greater awareness and understanding of their own emotions demonstrate 
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fewer disruptive behaviors (Cook, Greenberg, & Kusche, 1994), are more accepted by peers 
(Cassidy, Parke, Butkovsky, & Braungart, 1992), and are rated by their parents as having higher 
social competence compared to children who are less aware of their emotional experiences 
(Custrini & Feldman, 1989). While awareness and identification of one’s emotion has certainly 
been linked to positive social outcomes, there is also evidence that the ability to effectively 
manage one’s emotional experience is associated with positive social functioning and higher 
ratings of social competence, both contemporaneously and across time (Eisenberg, 1997a, 
Eisenberg, 1997b, Murphy, Shepard, Eisenberg, & Fabes, 2004). 
Not only does an awareness and ability to identify affect have implications for social 
functioning, but it is also has clinical relevance.  Mood and anxiety disorders by definition have 
an impact on an individual’s affective experience, and the ability to report on these affective 
states is important for diagnosis.  There is a growing awareness of the high prevalence of mood 
and anxiety disorders in individuals with autism (Mazefsky, Kao, & Oswald, 2011; Leyfer, et al., 
2006; Stewart, Barnard, Pearson, Hasan, & O'Brien, 2008; White, Oswald, Ollendick, & Scahill, 
2009).   Given that many of the diagnostic instruments used to screen for such disorders rely on 
the individual’s self-report of affective experience, it is important to have a better understanding 
of how these individuals process and report on their affective experiences.  
It is evident, then, that the “experiencing affect” component of ASC is highly relevant 
both to positive social outcomes and to the efficacious diagnosis of mental health issues, and thus 
it needs to be closely examined in individuals with autism in order to better understand their 
experiences and guide effective interventions.   
Although limited, some research has addressed the awareness of individuals with autism of 
their own affective experiences and their abilities to identify their feelings and the causes of these 
feelings.  Surprisingly, almost no work to date has examined the ability of individuals with autism to 
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manage their emotional experiences.  To gain a deeper understanding of each of these skills in 
individuals with autism, further research is clearly warranted.  The current study, however, focused 
on only the first two abilities of the “experiencing affect” component of ASC, namely, awareness of 
and identification of one’s own affect.   
In order to gain a clearer picture of the way in which individuals with autism experience and 
understand affect, it is helpful first to examine the literature from the perspective of how they 
understand others’ emotions in order to contrast that to how they understand their own.   
1.1.1 Awareness and Identification of Emotions in Others 
Typically developing children begin to understand situations as causes of emotions by the 
time they are three years old, and by the age of six they demonstrate an understanding of how desires 
and beliefs can impact emotions (Denham, 1986; Hadwin & Perner, 1991; Harris, Johnson, Hutton, 
Andrews, & Cooke, 1989; Rieffe, Terwogt, & Cowan 2005). Although somewhat delayed, by the 
time individuals with autism reach a verbal mental age of six years, they are as successful as 
typically developing individuals at predicting how situations might induce basic emotions in another 
person (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Dennis, Lockyer, & Lazenby, 2000; Downs & Smith, 2004; Hertzig, 
Snow, & Sherman, 1989; Hobson, 1986a; Prior, Dahlstrom, & Squires, 1990), and by the time they 
reach a verbal mental age of seven, they are able to understand how desires might affect emotions in 
another (Baron-Cohen, 1991; Downs & Smith, 2004).  Although there is evidence that individuals 
with autism have difficulty understanding emotions that are caused by beliefs (Baron-Cohen, 1991), 
it is possible that this is restricted to those individuals with a verbal mental age younger than seven, 
as by the time they reach a verbal mental age of nine, many individuals with autism are indeed able 
to pass first order theory of mind tasks, which would then facilitate an understanding of the 
relationship between beliefs and emotions (Happe, 1995).  
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While a number of studies indicate that individuals with autism can become quite adept at 
explaining what causes basic emotions in others, they seem to exhibit more difficulty with their 
understanding of self-conscious emotions, that is, emotions that require a sense of self and the ability 
to see oneself from the position of others, such as embarrassment, guilt, and pride (Lewis, Sullivan, 
Stanger, & Weiss, 1989).  Their understanding of embarrassment in others is minimal; they tend to 
rate scenarios as embarrassing even when they clearly are not, and they provide poorer justifications 
than typically developing individuals for scenarios in which a protagonist is doing or saying 
something embarrassing (Hillier & Allinson, 2002).  Embarrassment is not the only self conscious 
emotion for which they show limited understanding.  Hobson, et al., (2006) presented individuals 
with autism and individuals with mental retardation with video vignettes in which the protagonist 
experienced pride, guilt, or embarrassment, and then asked them to explain what the protagonists 
were feeling.  In general, both groups performed relatively poorly on this task.  In both groups, about 
25% of individuals were able to provide an account that related to pleasure in one’s accomplishment 
for pride, and responsibility for a negative action for guilt.  Only 16% of the individuals with autism 
and none of the individuals with mental retardation were able to provide accurate accounts of 
embarrassment.  Hobson, et al. also reported that while there was no significant correlation between 
verbal mental age and performance for the individuals with mental retardation, in individuals with 
autism, verbal mental age was significantly positively correlated to accounts of guilt and 
embarrassment.  
The findings on understanding emotion in others suggest that individuals with autism, 
although delayed, are able to perform successfully on tasks measuring their ability to understand 
basic emotions in others, although for emotions that require an understanding of an evaluation of self, 
their level of performance drops dramatically.  It is important to note that the basic emotions are 
often induced by universal circumstances (e.g., sadness induced by loss, fear induced by threat of 
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safety) (Ekman, 2003).  While typical children begin to understand these correlations through a 
natural process of observation, self-monitoring, and verbal feedback (Harris & Olthof, 1982), it 
is possible that children with autism, who might not learn about the world in the typical way, 
could begin to compensate by memorizing the ‘rules’ or prototypic examples of causes of 
emotion (e.g., people feel happy when it is their birthday; people feel sad when they lose 
something).  While this “rote memory” strategy would allow them to eventually be successful on 
tasks in which they are asked to describe others’ basic emotions, the strategy would be less 
effective with the self-conscious emotions, which require a strong self-evaluative component and 
are less explainable by universal circumstances.  Additionally, this “rote memory” strategy 
would not provide them with the tools necessary to reflect upon and expound specific causes of 
their own emotions if they found themselves outside of the realm of prototypical emotion 
inducing circumstances.  It is also interesting to note that performance on some of the more 
difficult tasks was related to verbal ability, but only for individuals with autism (Hobson, et al., 
2006).  It is possible, then, that they are using a verbally mediated compensatory strategy to “hack 
out solutions” and perform successfully on these tasks (while the individuals without autism who can 
perform the task are responding more intuitively).  Again, while this strategy may be effective in lab 
tasks when one has to evaluate causes of emotions in others, it may be less effective when evaluating 
the causes of emotions in oneself, especially with regard to self-conscious emotions. 
1.1.2 Awareness and Identification of Emotions in Oneself 
While there has certainly been more work examining the understanding of others’ emotions 
in individuals with autism, the work examining awareness and identification of affect in themselves 
has employed a broader scope of methodologies, primarily with children and adolescents, to address 
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these questions.  Thus, while the limited number of studies makes the conclusions one can draw more 
tentative, the differing methodologies each begin to provide unique insights into how individuals 
with autism experience their own affect.    
1.1.2.1 Awareness of on-line affect 
One method for evaluating an individual’s awareness of currently experienced affect is to 
induce affect, measure physiological reactivity, and at the same time ask the individual to report 
on his or her subjective experience.  Skin conductance response (SCR) studies in children and 
adults with autism have all shown no significant differences in SCR between the individuals with 
autism and typically developing individuals when shown positively-valenced, negatively-
valenced, and neutral pictures from the International Affective Picture System (IAPS) (Bolte, 
Feineis-Matthews, & Poustka, 2008; Shalom, Mostofsky, Hazlett, Goldberg, Landa, Faran, et al., 
2006).  Additionally, neither of the studies found dramatic differences between the two groups’ 
simultaneous reports of affective experience (Bolte, et al., 2008; Shalom, et al., 2006).  Of note, 
in one study adults with autism, despite similar SCR readings, reported significantly higher 
arousal than typically developing individuals when viewing neutral stimuli, suggesting the 
possibility of a disconnect between physiological reactivity and subjective experience in 
situations that typically developing individuals would classify as non-arousing (Bolte, et al., 
2008). 
In contrast to SCR studies, studies examining heart-rate response to affect-inducing 
situations in children and adults with autism indicate a differential physiological response to 
stressors in contrast to typically developing individuals. While the typically developing 
individuals experience an increased heart rate to stressors, individuals with autism showed little 
change from baseline. Interestingly, both groups reported similar levels of perceived distress 
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(Jansen, Gispen-de Wied, van der Gaag, & van Engeland, 2003; Jansen, Gispen-de Wied, 
Wiegant, Westenberg, Lahuis, & van Engeland, 2006).  As with SCR studies, there again appears 
to be a lack of connection between the physiological experience of affect and the self-perception 
of experiencing that affect, and it also appears as if individuals with autism are reporting higher 
levels of affect than are indexed by their physiological responses.  
These studies suggest that individuals with autism interpret their affective experience in 
ways that do not necessarily match their physiological experience.  Without further work 
examining physiological reactions to emotion inducing stimuli and situations in this population, 
these findings are difficult to interpret, as it is not yet clear if they are misinterpreting their 
internal signals and “incorrectly” reporting their affective states, or whether a different pattern of 
physiological responses in comparison to controls creates the same subjective experience in 
individuals with autism.  Some preliminary work indicates, however, that they may indeed have 
difficulty interpreting their affective states.  On a self-report measure, adults with autism, in 
comparison to typically developing adults, indicated that they have difficulty identifying and 
expressing their feelings (Berthoz & Hill, 2005; Hill, Berthoz, & Frith, 2004).  Unfortunately, no 
studies have examined whether this insight into their difficulties in identifying emotion is related 
to their performance on other emotion self-understanding tasks.  
1.1.2.2 Identification of causes of emotions in oneself 
  Of the studies that have examined individuals with autism’s understanding of their own 
emotions, the majority have asked high functioning children with autism to report on whether they 
had experienced specific emotions and what had made them feel that way (Bauminger, 2004; 
Bauminger & Kasari, 2000; Capps, Yirmiya, & Sigman, 1992; Jaedicke, Storoschuk, & Lord, 
1994; Losh & Capps, 2006; Rieffe, Meerum Terwogt, & Kotronopoulou, 2007).  Losh and 
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Capps measured the length of response that their subjects gave, and also incorporated non-
emotional states (“tired” and “sick”) into their questioning.  Individuals with autism did not 
differ from controls on either length of response or responses to questions about non-emotional 
states.  When examining responses to the emotion questions, however, some interesting findings 
emerged.  When discussing basic emotions, in comparison to typically developing controls, 
individuals with autism were more likely to report that they had never experienced a particular 
emotion, especially anger (Rieffe, et al., 2007), provided fewer examples of social interactions in 
the causes of their emotions (Jaedicke, et al., 1994; Rieffe, et al.), were less likely to provide 
specific and personalized causes of emotions (e.g., “I feel sad when people die,” versus, “I felt 
sad when my grandma died last year”) (Losh & Capps, 2006; Rieffe, et al., 2007), more 
frequently referenced behavioral or perceptual facial indices of emotion (e.g., “I was sad when 
tears started to come) (Losh & Capps, 2006), and more often gave idiosyncratic responses or 
mentioned preoccupations as causes of emotion (e.g., “hammers make me angry”) (Jaedicke, et 
al., 1994).  
Regarding self-conscious emotions, individuals with autism were more likely to describe 
embarrassment as having an external locus of control and were less likely to cite the presence of 
an audience (Capps, et al., 1992).  They were also less likely to give examples of threat of 
relationship loss for jealousy (Bauminger, 2004), and they provided fewer specific personal 
examples of jealousy (Bauminger).  Additionally, they did not describe contexts that clearly 
differentiated between self-conscious emotions (Losh & Capps, 2006), and they required 
significantly more prompting compared to both typically developing children and compared to 
the amount of prompting needed to describe basic emotions (Capps, et al., 1992; Losh & Capps, 
2006).  Not all studies, however, found such notable differences, with some suggestion that 
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younger children with autism, or those with lower than average IQ, were no worse than matched 
controls at describing their experiences of self-conscious emotions (Hobson, et al., 2006; 
Williams & Happe, 2010). 
In general, these findings stand in contrast to those examining the understanding of 
others’ emotions.  Whereas the performance of individuals with autism was indistinguishable 
from that of typically developing individuals when identifying causes of basic emotions in 
others, their ability to describe causes of their own basic emotions was somewhat atypical.  Their 
difficulty describing the causes of their own self-conscious emotions was seemingly even more 
pronounced.  These findings cannot simply be attributed to an impairment in discussing causal 
elements in their own lives, as individuals with autism did not differ in their accounts of causes 
of non-emotional events (Losh & Capps, 2006).  While it does appear that they might still have 
been employing a “rote memory” strategy, as evidenced by their tendency to provide fewer 
specific and personalized causes of emotion, this clearly did not hold up sufficiently to allow 
them to perform on par with typically developing individuals.  There are also two additional 
possible explanations as to why individuals with autism struggled with this task. 
The first possibility is that individuals with autism simply do not experience the same 
emotions that typically developing individuals do, or if they do, they experience them in a 
qualitatively different way.  This would explain their reports of never having experienced some 
emotions, as well as their difficulty with providing specific accounts of emotional experience.  
This possibility is unlikely, however, as many individuals with autism did acknowledge having 
experienced all the emotions listed, and parental reports, as well as a number of experimental 
studies, indicate that these individuals demonstrate signs of a number of different emotions, 
including pleasure, anger, sadness, jealousy, and pride (Attwood, 1998; Bauminger, 2004; 
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Capps, Kasari, Yirmiya, & Sigman, 1993; Hobson, et al, 2006; Kasari, Sigman, Baumgartner, & 
Stipek, 1993).  What is interesting to note, however, is that observations by others suggest that 
within a particular emotion, individuals with autism may not experience the same range of 
feelings that typically developing children do (Attwood, 1998; Attwood, 2008; Hobson, et al., 
2006; Muller & Schuler, 2006; Ricks & Wing, 1975).   
In a naturalistic observation of dinner table conversation and behavior, high functioning 
children with autism or Asperger’s syndrome provided the same proportion of references to 
negative affect as the typically developing children; however, they were much more likely to 
reference or exhibit intense negative affect, including temper tantrums and “anxiety attacks.”  
The negative affect displayed by their typically developing counterparts was more tempered and 
usually focused on labeling undesirable foods (Muller & Schuler, 2006). Parents also report that 
their children with autism often display intense, negative affect (Capps, et al., 1993).  Similar 
behavior has been observed clinically (Attwood, 2008; Ricks & Wing, 1975).  Tony Attwood, a 
leading authority on treating individuals with high functioning autism and Asperger’s syndrome, 
describes a common emotional reaction in these individuals which he calls a “depression attack” 
(Attwood, 2008).  He notes that often, individuals with autism will have a sudden, extreme 
negative reaction that does not seem warranted based on their behavior immediately prior, will 
remain highly distressed for a short time, and will then return to baseline.  He attributes this to 
their being less sensitive to the early signals of emotion, which prevents them from effectively 
regulating negative affect before it becomes extreme.  While these preliminary reports suggest 
that individuals with autism experience fewer gradations of negative affect and are more likely to 
exhibit only extreme negative affect, studies of the more self-conscious emotions, in particular 
pride and guilt, suggest that these individuals exhibit such emotions to a much lesser degree than 
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do typically developing individuals (Hobson, et al., 2006).  These abovementioned reports are 
preliminary, and it is important to remember that Attwood’s reports have not been validated 
empirically.  However, it is possible that if individuals with autism do not experience or are not 
aware of experiencing a graded range of affect, this deficit would make it difficult for them to 
form a well-developed concept of these emotional experiences, subsequently making it difficult 
to link precipitating circumstances to their internal emotion signals.     
A second explanation for the difficulties that individuals with autism exhibit in 
identifying causes of their emotions is that they may have poor memory for emotional events, 
which again might explain their increased reports of never having experienced an emotion, as 
well as their difficulty with providing specific accounts of emotional experience.  From 
preschool age, typically developing children readily recall and discuss emotion-laden events 
from their own lives (Fivush, Berlin, Sales, Mennuti-Washburn, & Cassidy, 2003; Lagutta & 
Wellman, 2002), and in general, typically developing children recall emotional information from 
events better than non-emotional information (Davidson, 2006).  While individuals with autism 
have unimpaired long term memory and above average rote memory (Toichi & Kamio, 2002), 
there is recent evidence suggesting that they have impaired episodic memory (Bruck, London, 
Landa, & Goodman, 2007; Crane & Goddard, 2008; Millward, Powell, Messer, & Jordan, 2000), 
and do not show the typical advantage for remembering emotionally significant information 
(Beversdorf, et al., 1998; Gaigg & Bowler, 2008).  It could be argued then, that individuals with 
autism may have difficulty recalling events and their associated emotions, and this could 
contribute to their poor performance on tasks requiring them to describe the causes of their 
emotions.  
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1.1.2.3 Spontaneous descriptions of affect 
While the majority of studies examining individuals’ with autism’s awareness and 
identification of their own affect have been conducted in laboratory settings, one study employed 
an observational study of these individuals in their home environment (Muller & Schuler, 2006).  
Children between the ages of 8- and 11-years-old were videotaped for two consecutive evenings 
during a family dinner, and their conversations were analyzed for affective references. The 
results from this procedure were surprising.  In comparison to typically developing children, the 
children with autism used a higher proportion of affective markers and were more likely to talk 
about their own affective experiences and less likely to talk about others’ affective experiences.  
This stands in stark contrast to lab based studies where individuals with autism exhibited more 
difficulty than typically developing individuals in their talk about their own emotions.  
Unfortunately, this study did not examine whether the affective references the children made 
were in relation to causes of emotion, nor did they code for whether or not the affective 
references seemed logical and appropriate to context.  It does, however, highlight the 
significance of the context wherein emotion understanding is studied, and it suggests that more 
ecologically valid studies could provide new insights into the affective experience of individuals 
with autism.      
1.1.3 Current Limitations in the Literature 
Although the literature to date provides some insight into the awareness of and ability to 
identify their affective experiences in individuals with autism, it is hampered by a number of 
issues.  The first is that the majority of the work has taken place in the context of the laboratory 
where either seemingly unnatural procedures are used to induce momentary affect (e.g., Bolte, et 
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al., 2008; Jansen, et al., 2006), or individuals are asked to recall and discuss past emotional 
experiences, a procedure that can be unreliable even for adept typically developing individuals 
(Moskowitz & Young, 2006).  Given the argument that individuals with autism may perform 
very differently in the laboratory in comparison to real world, on-line social situations (see Klin, 
Jones, Schultz, & Volkmar, 2003; 2005), and given potential difficulties with episodic memory 
(Bruck, et al., 2007; Crane & Goddard, 2008; Millward, et al., 2000), it seems imperative that 
their affective experiences are assessed in more ecologically valid ways. 
A second issue of note is that even researchers who have attempted to examine affective 
experience in a more naturalistic way have yet to examine whether spontaneously expressed 
affect is expressed in a contextually appropriate way (Muller & Schuler, 2006).  Even though it 
is promising that individuals with autism seem more likely to discuss affective experiences when 
at home, it is important to examine more closely the specific forms of affect they experience as 
well as their apparent understanding of those emotions. 
A third issue to consider is that much of what is considered clinical lore regarding the 
emotional experiences of individuals with autism has yet to be empirically validated (Attwood, 
1998; 2008).  Thus, while researchers often refer to the rapid onset of “emotional meltdowns” in 
individuals with autism, an affective reaction that could certainly impede their ability to form 
well developed concepts of negative affect, there is no empirical work that has examined this 
phenomenon closely. 
 Finally, no one has yet begun to relate performance on measures of affective awareness 
and ability to identify affect to broader measures of social functioning.  As discussed earlier, 
greater awareness of one’s emotional experiences predicts to better social outcomes in typically 
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developing individuals (e.g., Cassidy, et al., 1992; Custrini & Feldman, 1989), but it is unclear if 
this relationship holds for individuals with autism.  
1.1.4 Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) 
One methodology that could begin to address some of the above-mentioned limitations 
(particularly, issues one through three) is that of ecological momentary assessment (EMA).  
EMA is “a non-invasive method of gathering real-time data.  It incorporates multiple daily 
assessments, which allows for the detection of incremental variability in subject responses” 
(Axelson, et al., 2003).  In essence, research participants are contacted several times per day (via 
telephone or some other method) and asked to report on their current affective state and recent 
behaviors.  Not only does EMA allow one to collect real time data on affective experience while 
the participant is in his or her natural environment, but it has been demonstrated to be a more 
valid method of capturing day-to-day variability in affect than retrospective reports, which are 
subject to recall bias and reconstructed memories (Moskowitz & Young, 2006; Stone & 
Shiffman, 1994).  EMA methodology has been used effectively with participants of a broad age 
range and has shown to provide reliable measures of daily reports of affect (Moskowitz & 
Young, 2006).   
A number of studies have effectively used EMA methodology to examine the affective 
experiences of typically developing children and adolescents.  While to date the majority of 
studies have used some form of randomly programmed alarm to alert participants to write down 
their current affective states using pencil and paper self-reports (e.g., Larson, 1989; Larson & 
Lampman-Petraitis, 1989; Schneiders, et al., 2006; Silk, Steinberg, & Sheffield Morris, 2003), 
others have found comparable results having participants enter reports into electronic handheld 
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diaries (e.g., Whalen, et al., 2006), or providing live reports via cellular telephones (Axelson, et 
al., 2003; Silk, et al., 2007). 
EMA studies with typically developing children and adolescents have yielded a number 
of interesting results.  Individuals with no mood disorders report variable levels of positive affect 
(Axelson, et al., 2003; Haviland-Jones, Gebelt, & Stapley, 1997), and low, stable levels of 
negative affect (Axelson, et al., 2003; Haviland-Jones, et al., 1997; Silk, et al., 2007).  Also, age 
seems to play a role in the reporting of affect.  Younger adolescents (5th to 7th grade) are more 
likely to report low, stable levels of negative affect and extreme positive states, but older 
adolescents (9th to 12th grade) report a slightly wider range as well as a higher average level of 
negative affect, and they are more likely to rate their positive affect towards the middle of the 
emotional range (Haviland-Jones, et al., 1997; Larson & Lampman-Petraitis, 1989; Larson, 
Moneta, Richards, & Wilson, 2002).  In comparison to adults, adolescents report more negative 
affect, more extreme positive affect, and greater variation in affective states (Larson, 
Csikszentmihalyi, & Graef, 1980).    
EMA has also been used to examine the affective experiences of children and adolescents 
with mood disorders.  Children and adolescents with depression report more negative affect 
(Larson, Raffaelli, Richards, Ham, & Jewell, 1990; Silk, et al., 2007; Silk, et al., 2003; Whalen, 
Jamner, Henker, & Delfino, 2001), less positive average affect (Larson, et al., 1990), greater 
variability in negative affect (Costello, Benjamin, Angold, & Silver, 1991; Larson, et al., 1990; 
Silk, et al., 2003), more intense feelings of anger and sadness (Silk, et al., 2003), and a lower 
ratio of positive to negative affect (Silk, et al., 2007).  Age was also somewhat related to 
depression and affect in that individuals’ self-reported depression on the Child Depression 
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Inventory (CDI) was related to their daily reports of affect, but only from 7th grade onward.  
Younger children’s CDI scores and daily reported affect were unrelated (Larson, et al., 1990).    
1.2 CURRENT STUDY 
Understanding the degree to which individuals with autism are aware of and able to 
identify their emotions and their causes is important not only for predicting social functioning, 
but also for clinical practice and the diagnosis of mood and anxiety disorders.  Some research has 
begun to examine these issues, but to date much of the work is acontextual (e.g., Jaedicke et al., 
1994; Jansen, et al., 2006; Losh & Capps, 2006) and imposes potentially confounding memory 
demands (e.g., Losh & Capps; Rieffe, et al., 2007).  In addition, descriptions of these 
individuals’ affective experiences are often presented in the literature as de facto, despite the fact 
that their daily affective experiences have yet to be examined empirically (e.g., Atwood, 2008).  
Also, almost no work has examined the relationship between affective experience and social 
functioning in individuals with autism. Finally, the majority of previous work has been 
conducted with children between the ages of eight and 12 years old, thus it is unclear if prior 
findings generalize to older age groups. As such, the purposes of the current study were to gain a 
better understanding of how adolescents with autism report on their own affective experiences, to 
develop a clearer clinical picture of their typical daily affect, and assess whether awareness of their 
own affect was related to social and emotional functioning. 
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1.2.1  Specific Aims 
Specific aims of the current study were:  
1) To replicate, in an adolescent sample, previous findings regarding individuals with 
autism’s ability to report on their emotions in a laboratory setting. 
 2) To assess whether individuals with autism were better able to report on the causes of their 
emotions in situ in comparison to in the laboratory setting.  
3) To determine whether individuals with autism reported experiencing the same number of 
discrete emotions on a weekly basis in comparison to typically developing individuals, and whether 
they provided any in situ reports of experiencing self-conscious emotions. 
4) To examine the self-reported intensity and lability of positive and negative affect in 
individuals with autism in comparison to typically developing individuals. 
5) To identify if measures of affective understanding and awareness were related to social 
behavior in individuals with autism. 
6) To examine the relationship between daily self-reported affect and parent and self-reported 
depression and anxiety symptoms. 
  To expand upon the current literature, this study employed a more ecologically valid 
methodology for assessing affective experience: ecological momentary assessment (EMA).  Utilizing 
both laboratory based measures as well as EMA methodology allowed performance on reports of 
causes of emotions in both contexts to be compared.  EMA methodology also allowed us to 
examine reported levels of affect as it was occurring, thereby presenting a clearer picture of the 
day to day affective experiences of individuals with autism.   
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1.2.2 Hypotheses 
Based on the reviewed literature, the following hypotheses were proposed: 
Hypothesis 1a 
Compared to typically developing peers, when probed on the causes of their emotions in 
a lab setting, individuals with autism would be less likely to report they had felt an emotion, 
would be less likely to describe contexts that clearly differentiated between self-conscious 
emotions, and would be less likely to provide specific causes of emotion.  When probed on the 
causes of non-emotional experiences (i.e., tired, hungry) in a lab setting, individuals with autism 
would not differ from their typically developing peers in the appropriateness of causes they 
described.    
Hypothesis 1b 
If memory difficulties were indeed hampering the performance of individuals with autism 
when in the lab, then when probed about the causes of their emotions in situ they would be: a) 
less likely to report that they did not know the cause of the emotion, and b) more likely to 
provide specific causes of emotion.   
Hypothesis 2 
Compared to typically developing peers, when probed in situ, individuals with autism 
would report experiencing fewer discrete emotions over the course of the study and would 
endorse experiencing self-conscious emotions significantly less often.  
Hypothesis 3 
Individuals with autism would report greater intensity and lability of negative affect in 
comparison to typically developing individuals. 
Hypothesis 4 
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Compared to typically developing individuals, individuals with autism would have lower 
parent-rated scores of concurrent social skills.  In both typically developing individuals and 
individuals with autism, both self-reported impairment in cognitive processing of their own 
emotions, and poor performance on lab measures of their own emotion understanding, would 
predict to lower concurrent social skills as measured by parent reports and by self-reports.  
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2.0  METHOD 
2.1 PARTICIPANTS 
Participants were 19 individuals with high-functioning autism and 19 typically 
developing controls recruited by the Pittsburgh Autism Center for Excellence (ACE) at the 
University of Pittsburgh. The typically developing control group was matched to the autism 
group on chronological age, full-scale IQ, verbal IQ, and performance IQ.  Table 1 summarizes 
the participants’ demographic characteristics.  No significant differences existed between the 
autism and control groups on any of the demographic variables.  
Participants with autism were administered a diagnostic evaluation consisting of the 
Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule (ADOS; Lord et al., 2000) with confirmation by expert 
clinical opinion (for ADOS means see Table 1). Additionally, the Autism Diagnostic Interview-
Revised was administered to a parent (ADI-R; Lord, Rutter, & LeCouteur, 1994).  The ADOS 
was scored using the DSM-IV/ICD-10 Autism Diagnosis Algorithm (Lord, Rutter, DiLavore, & 
Risi, 2003).  Individuals who fell below the cutoff for “Autism” on the algorithm were excluded. 
Participants with autism were also required to be in good medical health, free of seizures, have a 
negative history of traumatic brain injury, and have an FSIQ > 80  and VIQ > 80 as determined 
by the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (WASI; Wechsler, 1999).  The IQ limit was 
implemented for two reasons. First, the nature of the study required verbal comprehension 
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abilities that may not be present in lower functioning individuals with autism.  Second, studying 
high-functioning individuals with autism allows for the discovery of potential deficits that are 
specific to autism and not the non-specific consequences of mental retardation.   
Control participants were volunteers recruited from the community.  Parents of potential 
control participants completed questionnaires of demographic and family information to 
determine eligibility.  Control participants were required to be in good physical health, free of 
past or current neurologic or major psychiatric disorders, have a negative family history of first 
degree relatives with major psychiatric disorders, and have a negative family history of autism 
spectrum disorder in first and second degree relatives.  Control participants were also excluded if 
they had a history of poor school attendance or evidence of a disparity between general level of 
ability and academic achievement suggesting a learning disability.   
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Table 1:  Demographic Characteristics of Autism and Control Groups 
 
  
Autism Group 
(n = 19) 
 
  
Control Group 
(n = 19) 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Range 
 
  
Mean 
 
SD 
 
Range 
Age (years) 14.68 1.92 11-17  14.11 1.6 11-17 
Full Scale IQ 106 13 87-127  111 9 97-128 
Verbal IQ 103 14 80-139  109 9 97-131 
Performance IQ 108 14 86-142  111 9 95-125 
ADOS        
     Total Score 14 3 10-20     
     Communication 5 1 3-8     
     Social 9 2 6-12     
      Res/Rep Behaviors 3 2 0-6     
Gender (M:F) 16:3  17:2 
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2.2 PROCEDURE 
2.2.1 In Laboratory 
Each participant first attended a session in the laboratory.  During this session, parental 
consent and participant assent were obtained.  Participants then completed the Emotional 
Experiences task, as well as questionnaires measuring alexithymia, depressive symptoms, 
anxiety symptoms, and social skills.  Parents completed measures of their children’s depressive 
symptoms, anxiety symptoms, and social skills.  A more complete description of the above-
mentioned scales is presented below. 
After completion of these tasks, the PI explained the EMA procedure to both the 
participant and the parent.  At the conclusion of the session, each participant was given an 
answer-only cellular phone and provided with a demonstration on how to use the equipment.  In 
addition, a “mock call” was practiced with the child in order to familiarize him or her with the 
format of the interview as well as to ensure the child understood each question being asked.  
Finally, the parent was provided an addressed, prepaid envelope in which to return the cellular 
phone at the end of the data collection period.  
3.2.1.1. Emotional Experiences 
3.2.1.1.1. Procedure 
 Personal accounts of emotional experiences were elicited through a procedure adapted 
from Losh and Capps (2006).  Participants were given a list of basic emotions (happy, sad, 
angry, afraid, nervous), self-conscious emotions (proud, embarrassed, guilty), and non-emotions 
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(tired, sick, hungry).  Non-emotions were included as a control condition to help ascertain 
whether any group difference that might emerge were specific to emotional experiences, or if 
there were differences when describing any type of causal experience.  Participants were asked 
to define each emotion and then tell the experimenter about a time when they felt that way.  If 
they were unable to provide an accurate definition of an emotion/non-emotion, a standardized 
definition was provided for them to ensure that they were aware of the meaning of the 
emotion/non-emotion before providing an account of their experience (see Appendix A).  
This interaction with the participant was videotaped and transcribed verbatim.  Coding 
conventions were adapted from Losh and Capps (2006) and Rieffe, et al. (2007).  Each transcript 
was coded by two research assistants, at least one of whom was blind to participant diagnosis.  
Coders were trained by the principal investigator and were required to achieve intercoder 
agreement of 80% or higher with the PI.  Intercoder reliability was computed for a subset of the 
data (35%).  All intercoder agreements fell within acceptable ranges (mean percent agreement 
above 84% for all variables).  All disagreements were discussed and resolved, and all data 
reflects consensus codes.  
3.2.1.1.2. Coding  
Participant responses for each emotion/non-emotion were coded on the following 
variables (for a coding key see Appendix B): 
1) Specific vs. Non-Specific Cause 
References which focused on a specific event that occurred in the past were coded as “specific” 
(e.g., “I felt sad when my dog died”).  References that contained no reference to a specific event, 
or that were presented in present tense, were coded as “non-specific” (e.g., “people make me 
angry,” “I feel sad when people die”). 
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2) Appropriateness of Causal Context 
There were three codes for “context”: 
a. Incorrect/inappropriate context 
Included references involving actions and events that, without further explanation, would 
not typically elicit the emotion/non-emotion in question (e.g., “I was sad one time when I 
got a birthday present”). 
b. Context with appropriate valence 
Included references to episodes that would tend to elicit feelings of appropriate valence 
but did not contain sufficient details or explanation for distinguishing the specific 
emotion/non-emotion from similarly valenced feelings (e.g., “I was proud when my mom 
gave me a present”). 
c. Appropriate context 
Included references describing unambiguously evocative contexts (e.g., “I was happy 
when I went to the zoo with my friends yesterday”). 
2.2.2 Ecological Momentary Assessment (EMA) 
2.2.2.1 Procedure 
EMA telephone calls began the first Thursday after the visit to the laboratory (if the visit 
occurred on a Thursday, calls began that day).  Data collection spanned 14 consecutive days.  On 
weekdays, to avoid interrupting the school day, two calls were made between the hours of 
4:00pm and 10:00pm (with the first occurring randomly between 4:00pm and 7:00pm, and the 
second occurring randomly between 7:01pm and 10:00pm).  On Saturday and Sunday, five calls 
were made each day between the hours of 10:00am and 10:00pm (with one each occurring 
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randomly within the following time-blocks: 10:00am to 11:00am; 12:01pm to 3:00pm; 3:01pm 
to 5:00pm; 5:01pm to 7:00pm; 7:01pm to 10:00pm).  If the participant did not answer on the first 
attempt, a second attempt was made again after approximately 10 minutes, and a third attempt 
was made 10 minutes after that.  If the participant did not answer on the third attempt, that time 
point was logged as missing data.  If the participant failed to answer the phone after three 
consecutive time blocks, a secondary telephone number (provided by the parent during the 
consent process) was contacted to ascertain whether the phone provided to the participant was 
still in working order.  In total, each participant received 40 data collection calls over the 
duration of the study.   
The compliance rate for both the autism and control groups was 78%, respectively, with 
participants completing an average of 31 of 40 calls (Autism group: SD = 4.2, Range: 24-39; 
Control group: SD = 4.6, Range: 22-37).  Previous studies with participants in the same age 
range have reported that their participants provided reports for a mean of 76% to 84% of data 
collection time points (e.g., Larson, et al., 2002; Schneiders, et al., 2006; Silk, et al., 2003), 
indicating that the current sample’s compliance rate is comparable to other studies.  Minimum 
numbers of completed reports required for inclusion in analysis have ranged from 15 to 24 
(Larson, et al., 2002; Silk, et al., 2003).  For this study, participants who completed fewer than 
24 calls (60%) were considered non-completers.  Data from one control participant could not be 
analyzed for this reason.  In addition, one participant with autism who answered 29 calls but 
refused to provide responses to any protocol questions for the last 14 calls was also considered a 
non-completer.   
Based on the work of Axelson, et al. (2003) and Silk, et al. (2003), during each telephone 
call, participants reported on four basic domains: 1) location, activity, and duration of activity at 
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the moment of the call, 2) social context at moment of call (i.e., with whom the participant was 
currently interacting, including electronic forms of interaction such as Instant Messaging), 3) 
current affect ratings (including both positive and negative affect) at the time of the call and 4) 
most negative and most positive affective experience over the past hour, when it occurred, and 
what caused it.  For the purposes of this study, only data from domain 3 were examined.  
Participant responses were recorded by hand by the research assistant making the telephone call, 
and they were also recorded using a digital voice recorder to ensure protocol fidelity.  Average 
call duration for the Autism group was 4.6 minutes (SD = 1.6; Range: 1 – 12) and for the Control 
group was 4.2 minutes (SD = 1.0; Range: 2 – 10).  A copy of the child telephone script (Axelson, 
et al., 2003; Silk, et al., 2007) can be found in Appendix C. 
To assess parents’ perceptions of their child’s daily affective responses, each child’s 
parents were called shortly after the final child call on 10 of the 14 days of the protocol.  Parents 
were contacted at a telephone number they specified during the lab visit, and the parent reported 
to have spent the most time with the child on that day was asked to respond to the questions.  If a 
parent did not answer on the first call attempt, they were re-contacted the following evening.  On 
average, parents of the Autism group completed 8 calls (SD = 1.4; Range: 6 – 10) and parents of 
the Control group completed 7 calls (SD = 1.4; Range: 5 – 10).  Parents were asked whether their 
child exhibited any “high intensity” affective responses that day (at a rating of “4” or “5”), and if 
so, what time the response occurred, what precipitated that response, and who the child was with 
when the response occurred.  A copy of the parent telephone script can be found in Appendix D. 
2.2.2.2 Measurement of in situ affect 
Affective ratings comprised a subset of 9 items from the Positive and Negative Affect 
Schedule for Children (PANAS-C; Laurent, et al., 1999), plus the addition of one additional self-
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conscious emotion, embarrassed.  Items on the PANAS-C are rated on a 5-point scale, where 1 = 
very slightly or not at all, 2 = a little, 3 = moderately, 4 = quite a bit, and 5 = extremely.  For this 
study, the code for 1 was changed from “very slightly or none at all” to “none at all” to simplify 
the distinction between a code of 1 and 2 for the individuals with autism.  Each participant was 
provided with a graphical representation of the scale to aid in conceptualizing the difference 
between each code (see Figure 1).  Such graphical representations are particularly helpful for 
individuals with autism when discussing gradations of affect (Attwood, 1998; 2008).   
 
 
 
Figure 1.  Graphical Representation (Thermometer) of PANAS-C Scale 
Each of the affective items was asked on each call to assess current affect.  If the 
participant endorsed a 4 or higher for the following items: happy, sad, angry, scared, nervous, 
proud, embarrassed, or guilty, they were asked, “What made you feel quite a bit/extremely X?”  
2.2.2.3 Indices of in situ affect 
 The following indices of affect were constructed: 
1. Total number of current emotions  
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 5 = Extremely 4 = Quite a bit 
3 = Moderately 
2 = A little 
1 = None at all 
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The total number of discrete items on the PANAS-C subscale that the participant 
endorsed experiencing at a score of 2 (a little) or higher was summed.  The participant 
was only given credit for each item once, regardless of how many times he/she endorsed 
experiencing that item.  Thus, scores could range from 0 (never endorsed any of the 
items) to 10 (endorsed each of the items at least once). 
2. Proportion of current self-conscious emotions 
The proportion of times that self-conscious items (guilty, proud, embarrassed) 
were endorsed as being experienced at a score of 2 (a little) or higher were  calculated 
from the total number of times that self-conscious emotions were probed.  Thus, the total 
number of times self-conscious items endorsed could range from 0 (never endorsed a 
self-conscious item) to 120 (endorsed all three self-conscious items at each of the 40 
times points). Proportion was calculated by dividing the total number of times endorsed 
by the total number of times probed. 
3. Intensity (Silk, et al., 2003) 
Intensity was calculated separately for each of the 10 items by averaging current 
affect ratings for each item across all time points.  Intensity reflected the mean level of 
each item the participant experienced over the 14 day period.  
4. Global Negative Affect (Silk, et al., 2007) 
Global Negative Affect was calculated by averaging across current angry, 
nervous, sad, and upset ratings across all time points. 
5. Lability (Larson, 1989) 
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Lability was calculated separately for each of the 10 items by calculating the 
standard deviation of the current affect rating across all time points.  Lability reflected the 
typical degree of fluctuation within the emotion over the course of two weeks.  
In addition to the above-mentioned variables, each response to the question, “What made 
you feel quite a bit/extremely X?” was coded using the same coding conventions noted under 
Emotional Experiences.   
2.2.3 Parent Report Coding 
Each parent report was coded against the completed child calls from that day.  If a parent 
reported that his or her child experienced a high intensity emotion on a given day, he or she was 
asked to approximate the time of day this occurred.  This parent report was then compared to the 
first child report completed after that reported time, but only if they occurred no more than 60 
minutes apart.  If no child report was completed within that time frame, the parent report was 
excluded from analysis for that emotion.  For the purposes of this study, each emotion on the 
parent reports was coded for the following variables: 
1)   Incident Proximity 
a) Child report occurred within 60 minutes following parent reported incident 
b) Child report occurred within 120 minutes following parent reported incident 
c) Child report occurred more than 120 minutes following parent reported incident 
2) Level Match 
If codeable (i.e., Incident Proximity was within 60 minutes): 
a) Parent rating was lower than child rating 
b) Parent rating was same as child rating 
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c) Parent rating was higher than child rating 
2.3   IN-LAB MEASURES 
2.3.1 Child Measures 
The Child Depression Inventory (CDI) is a 27-item self-report measure used to assess the 
number and severity of symptoms of depression in children and adolescents (Kovacs, 1992).  
Each of the 27 items comprises three responses, in order of increasing severity from 0 to 2.  
Participants are instructed to select the response that best describes themselves over the past two 
weeks.  Composite scores can range from 0 to 54, and are then converted to T-Scores, with 
higher scores representing more reported depressive symptomatology.   The CDI is the most 
widely used measure to assess depressive symptomatology in children and adolescents, and it 
demonstrates adequate internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .80 -.88) and test-retest 
reliability (r =.70 - .88) (Brooks & Kutcher, 2001).  
 Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders -- Child (SCARED-C) is a 41-item 
self-report measure used to assess the number and severity of symptoms of anxiety in children 
and adolescents (see Appendix E; Birmaher, et al, 1999).  Participants are instructed to circle the 
response that best describes their experience over the past three months.  Items are rated on a 3-
point scale (0 = Not True or Hardly Ever True; 1 = Somewhat True or Sometimes True; 2 = Very 
True or Often True).  Composite scores can range from 0 to 82, with higher scores representing 
greater anxiety symptomatology. A total score greater than or equal to 25 may indicate the 
presence of an Anxiety Disorder.   The SCARED-C demonstrates adequate internal consistency 
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(Cronbach’s alpha = .74 -.90), test-retest reliability (r =.70 - .90) and good discriminant validity 
(Birmaher, et al., 1997; 1999). 
Social Skills Rating System for Students (SSRS-Student) is a 39-item self-report measure 
for the target child and assesses cooperation, assertion, empathy, and self-control (Gresham & 
Elliott, 1990).  Participants are instructed to circle the response that indicates how often they do 
the behavior described.  Items are rated on a 3-point scale (0 = never; 1 = sometimes; 2 = very 
often).  Raw scores were converted to Standard Scores, and higher scores represent higher levels 
of prosocial behavior.  The SSRS-Student demonstrates adequate internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .83) and test-retest reliability (r = .68).  The SSRS-Student has been used 
successfully with high functioning children and adolescents with autism (Vickerstaff, Heriot, 
Wong, Lopes, & Dossetor, 2007).   
Toronto Alexithymia Scale-20 for Children (TAS-20 C) is a self-report of cognitive 
processing of emotions (Rieffe, Oosterveld, & Meerum Terwogt, 2006). The child version was 
adapted from the adult TAS-20 (Bagby, Parker, & Taylor, 1994) and is a 20-item scale that 
assesses three components of emotion processing: difficulty identifying feelings, difficulty 
describing feelings, and externally oriented thinking (see Appendix G).  Items are rated on a 3-
point scale (0 = not true; 1 = a bit true; 2 = true), with some items being negatively keyed.  
Higher scores indicate higher impairment in cognitive processing of emotions.  The TAS-20 C 
demonstrates acceptable internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha >.75) (Rieffe, et al., 2006). The 
TAS-20 has been used successfully with samples of high functioning adults with autism (Berthoz 
& Hill, 2005; Hill, et al., 2004).   
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2.3.2 Parent Measures 
Child Depression Inventory for Parents is a reworded version of the CDI designed so the 
parent can rate his/her child on 17-items (Wierzbicki, 1987).  The parent is instructed to select 
the response that best describes his/her child over the past two weeks.  Composite scores can 
range from 0 to 51, and are then converted to T-Scores, with higher scores representing more 
depressive symptomatology.  Previous studies demonstrate that the CDI-P has adequate internal 
consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .85-.89; Cole & Martin, 2005; Wierzbicki, 1987) and evidence 
of moderately high convergent validity (Cole, Truglio, & Peeke, 1997; Wierzbicki, 1987). 
Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders -- Parent (SCARED-P) is a 41-
item parent-report measure used to assess the number and severity of symptoms of anxiety 
parents perceive  in their children and adolescents (see Appendix F; Birmaher, et al, 1999). 
Parents are instructed to circle the response that best describes their child’s experience over the 
past three months.  Items are rated on a 3-point scale (0 = Not True or Hardly Ever True; 1 = 
Somewhat True or Sometimes True; 2 = Very True or Often True).  Composite scores can range 
from 0 to 82, with higher scores representing greater anxiety symptomatology.  A total score 
greater than or equal to 25 may indicate the presence of an Anxiety Disorder.   The SCARED-P 
demonstrates adequate internal consistency (Cronbach’s alpha = .74 -.90), test-retest reliability (r 
=.70 - .90) and good discriminant validity (Birmaher, et al., 1997; 1999). 
Social Skills Rating System for Parents (SSRS-Parent) is a 40-item self-report measure 
for the target child’s parent and assesses cooperation, assertion, responsibility, and self-control 
(Gresham & Elliott, 1990). The parent is instructed to circle the response that indicates how 
often his/her child does the behavior described, using the same scale described for the SSRS-
Student.  The SSRS-Parent also has an additional Problem Behaviors subscale which comprises 
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12 items assessing behaviors which might interfere with social skills performance.  The same 3-
point rating scale is used.  The SSRS-Parent demonstrates adequate internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s alpha = .90) and test-retest reliability (r = .87).   
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3.0  RESULTS 
Results are presented in the following sequence: 1) comparison of autism and control group 
performance on in-lab measures, including questionnaires and the Emotional Experiences task; 
2) examination of hypotheses related to in-lab versus in-situ descriptions of causes of emotion; 3) 
comparison of autism and control group performance on EMA reports, and 4) relationship 
between in-lab measures and EMA reports. 
3.1 IN-LAB MEASURES 
3.1.1 Parent and Self-Report Measures 
Descriptive statistics for all in-lab parent and self-report variables are presented in Table 
2.  To investigate differences between groups on parent and child reports on in-lab measures, 
mixed ANOVA’s were conducted with Group (Autism vs. Control) as the between-subjects 
condition, and Source (Child vs. Parent) as the within-subjects condition.   
For child depression symptoms as measured by the CDI, there was a main effect of 
Group, with parents and children in the autism group reporting significantly more child 
depression symptoms than parents and children in the control group, F (1, 36) = 23.74, p < .001. 
There was also a significant main effect of Source, with parents reporting more child depression 
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symptoms than their children, F (1, 36) = 5.83, p < .05.  The interaction of Group and Source 
was not significant, F (1, 36) = 2.00, p = .17.  On average, children in the autism group and their 
parents reported child depression levels in the average range, while children in the control group 
and their parents reported child depression levels in the slightly below average range.  A total of 
four children in the autism group reported depression symptoms above the cut-off for “at risk” 
for depression, while only one child in the control group was above cut-offs. Fisher’s exact test 
indicated the two groups did not differ significantly in this regard (p = .34).  A total of seven 
parents in the autism group reported child depression symptoms above the cut-off for “at risk” 
for depression, while only one parent in the control group reported symptoms above cut-offs. 
Fisher’s exact test indicated there were significantly more parents in the autism group who rated 
their children as “at risk” for depression (p < .05). 
Results were somewhat similar for child anxiety symptoms as measured by the 
SCARED. There was a significant main effect of Group, with parents and children in the autism 
group reporting significantly more child anxiety symptoms than parents and children in the 
control group, F (1, 36) = 26.48, p < .001. There was also a main effect of Source, but in contrast 
to depression symptoms, parents reported less child anxiety symptoms than their children did, F 
(1, 36) = 11.38, p < .01.  Again, the interaction of Group and Source was not significant, F (1, 
36) = 0.02, p = .89.  A total of 12 children in the autism group reported anxiety symptoms above 
the cut-off for a potential anxiety disorder, while only four children in the control group were 
above cut-offs.  Fisher’s exact test indicated this difference was significant (p < .05). A total of 
five parents in the autism group reported child anxiety symptoms above the cut-off for a 
potential anxiety disorder, while no parents in the control group reported symptoms above cut-
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offs. Fisher’s exact test indicated there were significantly more parents in the autism group who 
rated their children above cut-offs for a potential anxiety disorder (p < .05). 
For parent and child ratings of child social skills as measured by the SSRS, there was 
again a significant main effect of Group, with parents and children in the autism group reporting 
significantly lower child social skills than parents and children in the control group , F (1, 35) = 
23.63, p < .001.  There was also a main effect of Source, F (1, 35) = 8.07, p < .01, however, this 
was qualified by a significant interaction, F (1, 35) = 9.60, p < .01.  Follow-up t-tests indicated 
that children in the autism group rated their own social skills significantly higher than their 
parents did (t = 4.56, p < .001), while children and parents in the control group did not differ in 
their ratings of child social skills (t = -0.17, p = .87).  On average, children in the control group 
and their parents reported that the child exhibited slightly more social skills than the population, 
while children in the autism group and their parents reported that the child exhibits just as many 
social skills as the population. 
Reports of alexithymia, or impairment in cognitive processing of emotions (TAS-20 C) 
were completed by the children only.  Children in the autism group reported significantly higher 
impairment than controls did (t = 2.59; p < .05).   
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Table 2:  Descriptive Statistics for Self-Report Data for Autism and Control Groups 
 
  
Autism Group 
(N = 19) 
 
  
Control Group 
(N = 19) 
  
Mean 
 
(SD) 
 
Range 
 
  
Mean 
 
(SD) 
 
Range 
CDI Child Score a 47 (5.2) 41-58  42 (5.3) 35-55 
CDI Parent Score a 52 (7.8) 42-75  43 (5.0) 37-56 
SCARED Child 
Score 
 
28 (12.7) 5-48  13 (10.0) 0-35 
SCARED Parent 
Score 
 
19 (17.0) 2-65  5 (3.6) 0-11 
SSRS Student 
Score b 
 
105 (10.6) 92-132  114 (13.8) 80-130 
SSRS Parent Scoreb 94 (10.7) 75-114  115 c (9.4) 98-130 
TAS-20--C Total 
Score 
 
18 (8.0) 4-28  13 (4.8) 6-23 
Note: 
a T-Score 
b Standard Score 
c N = 18  
CDI = Child Development Inventory; SCARED = Screen for Child Anxiety Related Emotional Disorders; SSRS = 
Social Skills Rating System; TAS-20-C = Toronto Alexithymia Scale for Children 
 
 
 
 In order to examine associations between in-lab measures, bivariate correlations were 
conducted for the in-lab parent and child self-reports.  First, each variable was tested to assess 
whether it was normally distributed.  Distributions of variables were inspected graphically (using 
frequency distributions) and tested for normalcy using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test.  All 
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variables appeared normally distributed in both groups except for the CDI-Child (in both 
groups), and the SSRS-S (in the autism group).  To correct for skewness in the CDI-Child data, a 
log transformation was performed prior to running correlation analyses.  To maintain a consistent 
unit of measurement, the log transformation was performed on both the child and parent CDI 
data, and follow-up tests indicated the transformations resulted in normally distributed data for 
autism and control groups on both variables.  No transformation was able to improve the 
distribution of the SSRS-S data, thus Kendall’s tau is reported for correlations with this variable.  
Bivariate correlations are presented in Table 3. 
 For the autism group, there were no significant correlations between age and any of the 
measures.  There was a significant negative relationship between verbal IQ and difficulty with 
cognitive processing of emotions (r = -.50, p < .05), and between performance IQ and parent 
report of child anxiety symptoms (r = -.57, p < .05).  There were no significant relationships 
between any child and parent reports.  The only significant relationships that emerged between 
reports were between parent report of child depressive symptoms and parent report of child 
anxiety symptoms (r = .79, p < .01), and between child report of anxiety symptoms and child 
report of difficulty with cognitive processing of emotions (r = .59, p < .05).  
 As with the autism group, the control group showed no significant correlations between 
age and any of the measures.  For the control group, parent and child report was significantly 
correlated on several measures.  Parent and child report of child depressive symptoms were 
significantly related (r = .58, p < .01), as were parent and child report of child social skills (τ = 
.37, p < .05).  Parent report of child social skills also had a significant negative relationship with 
child report of depressive symptoms (r = -.50, p < .05). Similar to the autism group, child report 
of anxiety symptoms was significantly related to child report of difficulty with cognitive 
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processing of emotions (r = .54, p < .05).  Finally, parent reports of child depressive symptoms 
showed a significant negative relationship with parent reports of child social skills(r = -.69, p < 
.01; child), and child reports of depressive symptoms showed a significant negative relationship 
with child reports of social skills (τ = -.46, p < .01). 
Broadly, the data from parent and child reports indicated higher mood and anxiety 
symptoms, but lower social skills, in the individuals with autism.  In addition, while parent and 
child reports in the control group were sometimes significantly related, this was never the case in 
the autism group.   
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Table 3:  Correlations Among Self-Report Data for Autism and Control Groups 
Autism Group 
(N = 19) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Age           
2. VIQ .24         
3. PIQ -.26 .25        
4. CDI Child .22 .03 -.34       
5. CDI Parent  .12 -.12 -.23 - .16      
6. SCARED Child .02 -.16 -.57* .26 .08     
7. SCARED Parent  
 
.20 .10 -.30 -.05 .79** .19    
8. SSRS Student+  
   
-.03 -.06 .18 .03 .07 -.02 .02   
9. SSRS Parent  
 
-.09 .12 .26 -.03 -.22 .12 -.33 .28  
10. TAS-20 C   
      Total  
 
-.35 -.50* -.33 .21 .14 .59** .09 -.02 .03 
Control Group 
(N = 19) 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1. Age          
2. VIQ -.20         
3. PIQ -.24 .58**        
4. CDI Child  .38 .02 -.01       
5. CDI Parent  .16 -.07 -.16 .58**      
6. SCARED Child .21 -.03 .27 .41 .16     
7. SCARED Parent  
 
-.33 .29 .04 -.29 .11 -.22    
8. SSRS Student+  
   
-.01 -.24 -.22 -.46** -.30 -.15 .02   
9. SSRS Parent  
 
-.06 -.30 -.22 -.50* -.69** .21 -.08 .37*  
10. TAS-20 C      
      Total  
-.20 .30 .29 .53* .11 .54* -.26 -.31 .05 
Note:  N = 18 for Control Parent SSRS; *p ≤ .05; **p ≤ .01; + Kendall’s tau 
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3.1.2      Emotional Experiences Task 
3.1.2.1 Never felt/ Don’t know cause of emotion 
A series of Fisher’s exact tests were conducted to test the hypothesis that the individuals 
with autism would be more likely than controls to report they had never felt one of the probed 
emotions.  No significant differences were found with regard to the number of individuals with 
autism versus controls who reported never having felt one or more of the probed emotions (6 in 
the autism group and 5 controls), nor were there significant differences when responses were 
examined for basic emotions (2 in the autism group and no controls) and self-conscious emotions 
(4 in the autism group and 5 controls), respectively (all p’s > .46). There were no particular 
emotions that individuals in either group were more likely to report they had never felt. 
Additionally, although more individuals overall denied feeling a self-conscious versus a basic 
emotion, this difference was not significant (p = .38).   
Several individuals reported they had experienced particular emotions, but they were 
unable to describe what had caused the emotion (i.e., coded “I don’t know”).  Fisher’s exact tests 
were conducted to determine if the number of individuals providing these responses differed by 
group, and again, no significant differences were found, both overall (5 in the autism group, 2 in 
the control group), and when responses were examined for basic emotions (1 in the autism group 
and no controls) and self-conscious emotions (4 in the autism group and 2 in the control group) 
separately (all p’s > .67). In addition, when examined as a function of the proportion of times 
they endorsed feeling an emotion but could not describe a cause, individuals with autism did not 
differ significantly from controls (M = 5.4% vs. M = 1.4%), t = 1.34, p = .19. Again, while more 
individuals overall were unable to describe the cause of self-conscious versus basic emotions, the 
difference was not significant (p = .16).   
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3.1.2.2 Appropriateness of causal context 
To determine whether the causes of emotion provided by individuals with autism differed 
from controls in their overall contextual appropriateness, and also to examine whether this 
differed by account type, a mixed ANOVA was conducted, with Group (Autism vs. Control) as 
the between group variable, and Emotion Type (Basic vs. Self-Conscious vs. Non-Emotion) as 
the within group variable.  In order to account for the different number of exemplars within each 
type of emotion and non-emotion, mean appropriateness scores were calculated for each account 
type.  Significant main effects were found for both diagnosis, F (1, 36) = 5.98, p <.05 and 
emotion type, F (2, 72) = 6.69, p < .01.  More importantly, results indicated a significant 
interaction between the Group and Emotion Type variables, F (2, 72) = 4.80, p <.05.  The mean 
scores are presented in Figure 2. 
To understand this interaction, post-hoc Bonferroni corrected simple effects analyses 
revealed that, consistent with hypotheses, individuals with autism provided significantly fewer 
contextually appropriate causes of self-conscious emotions than controls (p < .05),  marginally 
fewer contextually appropriate causes of basic emotions (p = .09), and did not differ in their 
accounts of non-emotions (p = .42).  Additionally, a one-way ANOVA indicated the 
performance of the autism group differed significantly by emotion type, F (2, 36) = 8.55, p <.01, 
with the post-hoc test indicating that their performance on self-conscious emotions was 
significantly worse than for non-emotions (p < .05), and marginally worse than for basic 
emotions (p = .08).  This difference in performance by emotion type was not seen in the control 
group, F (2, 36) = 0.48, p = .62. 
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To determine if performance on this task was related to age or cognitive ability, bivariate 
correlations were conducted for age, verbal IQ, and performance IQ.  There were no significant 
correlations in either group (all p’s > .37).  
 
 
Figure 2.  Mean Appropriateness Scores by Condition (* p < .05; ^ p = .09) 
3.1.2.3 Specific, personalized causes of emotion 
To examine the hypothesis that individuals with autism would be less likely to provide 
specific, personalized causes of emotion, the percentage of an individual’s responses that were 
coded as “specific” was utilized as the dependant measure of interest.  Contrary to expectations, 
individuals with autism were actually more likely to provide specific, personalized causes (M = 
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61.2%) rather than non-specific causes (M =38.8%), and this difference approached significance, 
t = 1.66, p = .11.  Results were similar for the control group, with controls being significantly 
more likely to provide specific, personalized causes (M = 72.3%) than non-specific causes (M = 
27.7%), t = 3.6, p <.01. When comparing the two groups, results indicated no significant 
difference in the percentage of specific, personalized causes described, t = -1.21, p = .23.   
To determine whether the reporting of specific, personalized causes differed for basic and 
self-conscious emotions, and also to compare the responses for non-emotions,  a mixed ANOVA 
was conducted, with Group (Autism vs. Control) as the between subjects variable, and Emotion 
Type (Basic vs. Self-Conscious vs. Non-Emotion) as the within subject variable.  As with the 
appropriateness of context analyses, to account for the different number of exemplars within 
each type of emotion and non-emotion, percentage scores were calculated for each account type.  
There was a significant main effect of Emotion Type, F (2, 70) = 3.98, p < .05, and Bonferroni 
corrected post-hoc comparisons showed that individuals across both groups provided 
significantly more specific, personalized causes of self-conscious emotions (M = 76.3%) than of 
basic emotions (M = 62.7%) (p < .05). Self-conscious emotions and basic emotions did not differ 
from non-emotions (M = 65.7%) (p > .23 for both comparisons). Results showed no significant 
main effect of group (F (1, 35) = 0.72, p = .40), and the Group x Emotion Type interaction for 
specific, personalized causes of emotion was also non-significant (F (2, 70) = 0.52, p = .59).  
To determine if performance on this task was related to age or cognitive ability, bivariate 
correlations were conducted for age, verbal IQ, and performance IQ.  There were no significant 
correlations in either group (all p’s > .13). 
Overall, results from the Emotional Experiences task provided partial support for our 
hypotheses.  Contrary to expectations, there were no differences between groups in how 
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frequently they denied having felt an emotion or knowing its cause.  They also did not differ in 
the proportion of specific, personalized responses they provided.  Consistent with hypotheses, 
the autism group was more impaired than the control group in describing appropriate causal 
contexts for emotions, but not for non-emotions.  A sample of participant responses can be seen 
in Appendix H. 
3.2 EMA DATA 
Two individuals, one in the autism group and one in the control group, were considered 
non-completers and were excluded from all EMA data analyses.  The non-completer in the 
autism group did not differ from the completers in the autism group on any demographic 
variables (age, IQ, ADOS scores) or on any parent report or child self-report measures. The non-
completer in the control group was female, but otherwise did not differ from completers in the 
control group on any demographic variables. The non-completer did, however, have significantly 
higher scores on both the child and parent CDI than non-completers (p < .05), although these 
scores still fell within the average range of depression compared to the CDI normative sample.      
3.2.1 In Situ Assessment of Emotional Experiences 
3.2.1.1 Preliminary analyses 
During the EMA procedure, each time an individual endorsed experiencing either happy, 
sad, angry, nervous, scared, guilty, embarrassed, or proud (i.e., one of the emotions that was also 
probed during the in-lab Emotional Experiences task) at  “high-intensity” (at a level 4 or 5; 
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“quite a bit” or “extremely), they were probed as to the cause of that emotion.  Table 4 presents 
descriptive data on the number of responses that were probed.  
A mixed ANOVA of Group (Autism vs. Control) by Valence (Positive vs. Negative) 
indicated that individuals in both groups endorsed significantly more positively than negatively 
valenced high intensity emotions, F (1, 33) = 302.0, p < .001.  To determine whether 
descriptions of causal contexts differed for positively and negatively valenced emotions, 
responses were compared by group.  No significant differences emerged (all p’s > .17), thus data 
was collapsed across valence for subsequent analyses. 
When responses were examined as a function of the number of opportunities available to 
endorse each emotion type (i.e., basic or self-conscious), both groups endorsed a significantly 
higher proportion of high-intensity basic emotions than high-intensity self-conscious emotions, F 
(1, 34) = 31.8, p < .001.  Also, while all but one individual with autism and all controls endorsed 
at least one or more high-intensity basic emotions, six individuals with autism and nine controls 
failed to endorse at least one or more high-intensity self-conscious emotions.  Given the resulting 
discrepancies in cell sizes for basic versus self-conscious emotions, further analyses were run 
separately for each emotion type.  Also, when comparing data for in lab versus in situ 
performance, only those subjects who had data from both test phases were included in the 
analyses.  Descriptive data for all coded variables is presented in Table 5. 
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Table 4:  Descriptive Statistics for EMA Current Emotions that were Endorsed as “High Intensity” 
 
  
Autism Group 
(N = 18) 
 
  
Control Group 
(N = 18) 
  
Mean 
 
(SD) 
 
Range 
 
  
Mean 
 
(SD) 
 
Range 
Total # HI Reports 
 
19.8 (17.6) 0-64  15.3 (11.2) 1-38 
    Total # Basic    
    HI Reports 
 
15.1 (11.3) 0-35  14.44 (10.6) 1-37 
    Total # Self- 
    Conscious  
    HI Reports 
 
4.8 (8.5) 0-29  0.9 (1.2) 0-4 
   % of all Basic  
   probed that were  
   HI  
 
9.5 (7.0) 0-23  9.1 (6.3) 1-20 
    % of all Self- 
   Conscious probed  
   that were HI  
 
5.1 (8.9) 0-31  1.0 (1.3) 0-4 
 
Note: 
HI = High Intensity 
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Table 5:  Descriptive Statistics for Emotional Experience Variables both In-Lab and In Situ 
 
 Autism Group 
(Basic: N = 18; SC: N = 12) 
 Control Group  
(Basic: N = 18; SC: N = 9) 
 In Lab In Situ  In Lab In Situ 
  
Mean  
 
(SD) 
 
Mean 
 
(SD) 
  
Mean 
 
(SD) 
 
Mean 
 
(SD) 
 
SPECIFIC 
 
% of All Emotions  
 
 
61.8 
 
(31.0) 
 
85.2 
 
(19.0) 
  
71.4 
 
(27.4) 
 
90.1 
 
(13.0) 
   % of Basic 
 
59.1 (31.4) 86.5 (18.6)  66.7  (32.1) 89.0 (15.1) 
   % of Self-Conscious  
 
    
73.6 (32.9) 78.0 (33.7)  74.1 (27.8) 92.6 (22.2) 
APPROPRIATENESS 
  
Basic 
 
 
2.78 
 
(.30) 
 
2.60 
 
(.71) 
  
2.94 
 
(.11) 
 
2.83 
 
(.34) 
Self Conscious 
 
2.63 (.47) 2.53 (.51)  2.83 (.52) 2.74 (.52) 
 
3.2.1.2 Don’t know cause of emotion 
When probed on the causes of high intensity emotions experienced in situ, only two 
controls and one individual with autism could not identify the cause of an emotion they 
endorsed.  All three instances occurred when the individuals endorsed feeling “happy” at high 
intensity.  Fisher’s exact tests were conducted to determine if the number of individuals 
providing these responses differed by group and by situation (i.e., in-lab versus in situ), and no 
significant differences were found (all p’s > .24).  While the number of individuals in each group 
unable to identify the cause of an endorsed emotion did not differ by situation, when examined 
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as a function of the proportion of times they endorsed feeling an emotion but could not describe 
a cause, consistent with hypotheses, individuals with autism were significantly less likely to 
endorse an emotion in situ and then not provide a cause (M = 0.4%) than they were to endorse an 
emotion in the lab and not provide a cause (M = 5.4%), t = 1.77, p < .05.  The pattern was the 
same in the control group, with a trend towards significance (M = 0.6% vs. M = 1.4%), t = 1.33, 
p = .10. 
3.2.1.3 Appropriateness of causal context 
In situ 
To compare whether the contextual appropriateness of causes of emotions provided in 
situ by individuals with autism differed from controls, t-tests were conducted for basic and self-
conscious emotions (Bonferroni correction was employed to account for multiple comparisons).  
Groups did not differ significantly for either emotion type (Basic: t = -0.94; p = .35; Self-
conscious: t = -1.09; p = .29).   
In-lab versus in situ  
To determine if individuals’ performance differed in-lab versus in situ, a mixed ANOVA 
was conducted, with Group (Autism vs. Control) as the between subjects variable, and Setting 
(Lab vs. In Situ) as the within subject variable. Separate analyses were conducted for basic and 
self-conscious emotions.  Means are presented in Table 5.  For basic emotions, there was a 
marginally significant main effect of Group, F (1, 34) = 3.93, p = .08, with the autism group 
performing worse than the control group at describing contextually appropriate causes for basic 
emotions.  The effect of Setting (F (1, 34) = 2.09, p = .16) and the interaction (F (1, 34) = 0.01, p 
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= .95) were non-significant. There were no significant main effects and no significant interaction 
for self-conscious emotions (Group: F (1, 19) = 1.89, p = .19; Setting: F (1, 19) = 0.82, p = .38; 
Interaction: F (1, 19) = 0.03, p = .86).   
3.2.1.4 Specific, personalized causes of emotion 
In situ 
When describing causes of their emotions in situ, individuals with autism were 
significantly more likely to provide specific causes (M = 85.2%) than non-specific causes (M = 
14.8%), t = 7.64; p < .001, and this was also true of the control group (M = 90.1% vs. M = 9.9%), 
t = 13.1; p < .001.  As with the in-lab findings, there was no difference between the two groups 
in the percentage of specific accounts they provided for either basic or self-conscious emotions (t 
= -.31, p = .76; t = -1.13, p = .27).  
In-lab versus in situ  
To determine if, as hypothesized, individuals with autism would be more likely to 
provide specific, personalized causes of emotions when probed in situ versus in the lab, a mixed 
ANOVA was conducted, with Group (Autism vs. Control) as the between subject variable, and 
Setting (Lab vs. In Situ) as the within subject variable.  Separate analyses were conducted for 
basic and self-conscious emotions.  Means are presented in Table 5.  For basic emotions, there 
was a significant main effect of Situation, with significantly more specific accounts provided in 
situ, across groups, F (1, 32) = 14.99, p ≤ .01.  The main effect of Group (F (1, 32) = 0.71, p = 
.41) and the interaction (F (1, 32) = 0.15, p = .70) were non-significant.  For self-conscious 
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emotions, the main effects and interaction were non-significant (Group: F (1, 19) = 0.59, p = .45; 
Situation: F (1, 19) = 1.62, p = .23; Interaction: F (1, 19) = 0.62, p = 0.44).     
Overall, results from the in situ assessment of emotional experiences provided partial 
support for our hypotheses.  In situ, individuals with autism were significantly less likely to 
endorse an emotion and then not provide a cause than they were when in the lab.  Also, even in 
situ, individuals with autism provided fewer contextually appropriate causes for the emotions 
they endorsed than controls did, although the finding was only significant for basic emotions.  
Results also indicated that the individuals with autism provided more specific, personalized 
causes of emotions in situ in contrast to in the lab, although this was only significant for basic 
emotions.  Contrary to expectations, this pattern of results for specific, personalized emotions 
was the same, albeit attenuated, for controls.    
3.2.2 Emotions In Situ: Number & Frequency Endorsed 
To test the hypothesis that individuals with autism would report experiencing fewer 
discrete emotions than controls over the course of two weeks, groups were compared on the total 
number of discrete emotions they endorsed as experiencing at a level 2 (“a little bit”) or higher.  
Descriptive data is presented in Table 6.  A mixed ANOVA (Group x Emotion Type) was 
conducted to compare the proportion of discrete basic emotions endorsed (out of 7) to the 
proportion of discrete self-conscious emotions endorsed (out of 3).   There was a main effect of 
Emotion Type, F (1, 34) = 6.43, p < .05, showing that individuals endorsed experiencing a 
higher proportion of the basic emotions than the self-conscious emotions.  There was also a main 
effect of Group, F (1, 34) = 4.0, p ≤ .05, but contrary to expectations, individuals with autism 
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endorsed experiencing a higher number of discrete emotions than controls did.   The interaction 
was not significant F (1, 34) = 1.74, p = .20.   
Although the individuals with autism endorsed experiencing an overall higher number of 
discrete emotions over the course of the study, it was important to examine the frequency with 
which both groups endorsed experiencing each emotion type (basic versus self-conscious), as an 
individual could endorse experiencing each emotion only one time over the two weeks, and still 
end up with a high score in the above analysis.  Descriptive data is presented in Table 6. A mixed 
ANOVA (Group x Emotion Type) indicated a main effect of Emotion Type, F (1, 34) = 6.06, p < 
.05, showing that individuals endorsed experiencing basic emotions more frequently than self-
conscious emotions.  There was no main effect of diagnosis (F (1, 34) = 1.99, p = .17) and no 
significant interaction (F (1, 34) = 1.12, p = .30), indicating that, on average, individuals with 
autism endorsed experiencing emotions at a Level 2 or higher just a frequently as controls did.    
To explore which emotions were endorsed most frequently, and if this differed by group, 
a mixed ANOVA (Group x Emotion) was run for basic and self-conscious emotions, 
respectively.  For basic emotions, there was a main effect of Emotion, F (6, 154) = 264.88, p < 
.001, and Bonferroni corrected post-hoc comparisons indicated individuals endorsed Happy 
significantly more than any other emotion (p < .001), and Scared significantly less often than any 
other emotion (p ≤.05).  Happy was followed by Upset, which was endorsed significantly more 
often than Lonely (p < .01).  Sad, Angry, and Lonely did not differ significantly from each other 
(all p’s > .20).  For basic emotions, there was no main effect of Group (F (1, 34) = 0.72, p = .40), 
and no significant interaction (F (6, 154) = 0.53, p = .73).  For self-conscious emotions, there 
was a main effect of Emotion, F (2, 40) = 45.62, p < .001, with individuals endorsing Proud 
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more frequently than Guilty and Embarrassed (p < .001).  The main effect of group F (1, 34) = 
2.53, p = 0.12) and the interaction were not significant (F (2, 40) = 0.20, p = 0.70.   
Overall, these results failed to support our hypotheses and instead indicated that 
individuals with autism endorsed feeling a higher number of discrete emotions over two weeks 
than controls did.  Additionally, they endorsed experiencing self-conscious emotions with the 
same frequency that controls did.   
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Table 6:  Total EMA Current Emotions Endorsed at Level 2 or Higher  
 
  
Autism Group 
(N = 18) 
 
  
Control Group 
(N = 18) 
  
Mean 
 
(SD) 
 
Range 
 
  
Mean 
 
(SD) 
 
Range 
Total Discrete 
Emotions Endorsed a 
 
8.11 (1.97) 4-10  6.61 (2.95) 2-10 
    Total Discrete    
    Basic Endorsed b    
     
5.78 (1.31) 4-7  4.94 (2.21) 1-7 
    Total Discrete  
    Self-Conscious  
    Endorsed c    
 
2.33 (0.84) 0-3  1.67 (0.97) 0-3 
 % Basic Endorsed d  
 
29.58 (15.25)   25.46 (13.85)  
    Happy 98.29 (2.6)   98.99 (1.7)  
    Upset 23.32 (20.22)   17.10 (23.27)  
    Sad 23.02 (23.13)   14.74 (18.56)  
    Angry 20.61 (19.41)   16.79 (22.92)  
    Nervous 18.44 (22.01)   13.66 (18.13)  
    Lonely 11.65 (19.60)   9.24 (13.78)  
    Scared 
 
11.70 (18.28)   7.71 (11.81)  
% Self-Conscious 
Endorsed  e 
 
26.05 (21.02)   16.61 (13.83)  
    Proud 53.14 (38.55)   41.38 (34.11)  
    Guilty 14.44 (19.57)   3.95 (6.77)  
    Embarrassed 10.57 (17.37)   4.50 (10.66)  
Note: 
a Out of 10; b Out of 7; c Out of 3 
d Of all Basic assessed, % endorsed 
e Of all Self-Conscious assessed, % endorsed 
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3.2.3 Emotions In Situ: Intensity and Lability 
To assess the hypothesis that individuals with autism would report greater intensity and 
lability in negative affect, a series of repeated measures analyses were computed.  To examine 
intensity, data were analyzed using repeated measures linear mixed effects models.  This analytic 
strategy accounts for the nested structure of the data (i.e., observations were nested within 
individuals) as well as the fact that the number of observations varies across individuals.  Given 
that the lability score is inherently a summary score (standard deviation of current affect rating 
across time points for each emotion), t-tests or ANOVAs were used to compare lability across 
the groups. 
 Given the relatively infrequent endorsement of experiencing “lonely,” “scared,” “guilty,” 
and “embarrassed,” these emotions were excluded from the intensity and lability analyses.  In 
addition, given that “proud” was the only remaining self-conscious emotion, it too was excluded 
from analyses.  Data for the remaining emotions are presented in Table 7.     
3.2.3.1 Intensity 
Separate models were computed for “upset,” “sad,” “angry,” and “nervous,” as well as 
the summary score of “Global Negative Affect.”  In addition, a model was computed for “happy” 
to explore if any trends that emerged for negative affect were similar for positive affect.  Each 
model included only the main effect of diagnosis. The Bonferroni correction was applied to 
account for multiple comparisons (α < .008).  Means are presented in Table 7.  There was a 
significant main effect of diagnosis for “upset” (F (1, 876) = 11.10; p ≤.001; 95% CI = .05 - .19), 
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“sad” (F (1, 666) = 9.72; p ≤.002; 95% CI = .03 - .14), “nervous” (F (1, 756) = 11.36; p ≤.001; 
95% CI = .04 - .15), and “Global Negative Affect” (F (1, 851) = 13.40; p ≤.001; 95% CI = .04 - 
.14), with individuals with autism reporting significantly higher overall intensity of the emotions 
than controls. After correcting for multiple comparisons, diagnosis was not related to intensity of 
“angry” (F (1, 740) = 2.88; p = .09; 95% CI = -0.009 - .12).  Unlike for negative affect, controls 
reported a higher intensity of “happy” than individuals with autism did, although after correcting 
for multiple comparisons, the main effect of diagnosis was not significant (F (1, 1093) = 3.96; p 
= .05; 95% CI = -.22 - -.002).  In addition, the effect size of this difference was negligible.   
3.2.3.2 Lability 
To assess whether lability of negative affect differed between groups and also by 
emotion, a mixed ANOVA of Group (Autism vs. Control) by Emotion (Upset vs. Sad vs. 
Nervous vs. Angry) was conducted.  Means are presented in Table 7.  There was a significant 
main effect of Diagnosis, F (1, 34) = 5.88; p < .05, but this was subsumed by a significant 
interaction, F (3, 98) = 3.70; p < .05 (see Figure 3).  Bonferroni corrected post-hoc simple effects 
analysis found that individuals with autism had greater lability than controls in their reports of 
“upset” and “sad” (p < .01), but no significant differences in their lability for “nervous” and 
“angry” (p’s > .12).   In addition, for the individuals with autism, lability differed significantly 
by emotion (F (3, 51) = 4.55, p < .01), with Bonferroni corrected post-hoc tests indicating 
significantly more lability for “upset” than “nervous” (p < .05).  This was not true for controls, 
with no significant differences by emotion (F (3, 41) = 0.54, p = .63).  A t-test comparing groups 
on Global Negative Affect found that individuals with autism had greater negative lability 
overall, t = 2.47, p < .05.  Finally, a t-test indicated that individuals with autism also showed 
greater lability in their reports of “happy,” t = 2.45, p < .05.   
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Overall, results were consistent with hypotheses and indicated that, in general, the 
negative affect reported by individuals with autism was higher in intensity and showed more 
lability than controls.  Positive affect (“happy”) was also more labile in individuals with autism.   
 
 
Figure 3.  Mean Lability of Negative Affect by Group (**p < .01) 
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Table 7:  Intensity and Lability of EMA Current Emotions  
 
  
Autism Group 
(N = 18) 
 
  
Control Group 
(N = 18) 
 
  
Mean 
 
(SD) 
 
Range 
 
  
Mean 
 
(SD) 
 
Range 
 
d 
Intensity         
Happy 3.39 (1.06) 2.24 - 4.87  3.50 (0.84) 2.71 - 4.92 -0.11 
Upset 1.38 (0.83) 1.00 - 2.24  1.19 (0.46) 1.00 – 1.86 0.28 
Sad 1.33 (0.70) 1.00 - 2.24  1.17 (0.44) 1.00-1.71 0.27 
Angry 1.33 (0.76) 1.00 - 1.88  1.22 (0.57) 1.00-2.36 0.16 
Nervous 1.27 (0.64) 1.00 - 2.09  1.17 (0.49) 1.00-1.59 0.18 
Global Negative 
Affect 
1.33 (0.57) 1.02 – 1.96  1.19 (0.35) 1.00 – 1.87 0.30 
         
Lability         
Happy 0.76 (0.22) 0.28 – 1.22  0.60 (0.19) 0.26 – 0.97 0.78 
Upset 0.68 (0.37) 0.00 – 1.30  0.31 (0.27) 0.00 – 0.82 1.14 
Sad 0.58 (0.28) 0.00 – 1.07  0.32 (0.25) 0.00 – 0.77 0.98 
Angry 0.58 (0.42) 0.00 – 1.31  0.37 (0.33) 0.00 – 1.10 0.56 
Nervous 0.44 (0.34) 0.00 – 1.00  0.36 (0.30) 0.00 – 0.94 0.25 
Global Negative 
Affect 
0.61 (0.30) 0.14 – 1.15  0.38 (0.26) 0.00 – 0.74 0.82 
         
 
d = effect size, calculated using Effect Size Generator from Clintools 4.1C (Devilly, 2005)  
3.2.4 Gradations of Affect 
To assess whether the autism and control groups differed in their use of the rating scale 
for reporting current affect, the proportion of reports for which they used each number on the 
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scale (1, 2, 3, 4, and 5) was calculated for Global Negative Affect (i.e., collapsed across “upset,” 
“sad,” “angry” and “nervous”) as well as for “happy.”  Descriptive statistics for these variables 
are presented in Table 8.  To compare groups, a mixed ANOVA with Group (Autism vs. 
Control) by Rating (Level 1, Level 2, Level 3, Level 4, Level 5) was conducted.   
For Global Negative Affect, there was a significant main effect of Rating, F (4, 39) = 
291.64, p < .001.  Bonferroni corrected post hoc comparisons indicated that Level 1 (“none at 
all”) was endorsed significantly more often than all other levels (all p’s < .001), followed by 
Level 2 (“a little bit”), which was endorsed significantly more often than the Levels 3, 4, and 5 
(all p’s ≤ .001), followed by Level 3 (“moderately”), which was endorsed significantly more 
often than Levels 4 and 5 (all p’s ≤ .001), followed by Level 4 (“quite a bit”) and Level 5 
(“extremely), which did not differ significantly from each other.  The main effect of Group and 
the interaction were not significant (Group: F (1, 34) = 1, p = .32; interaction: F (4, 39) = 0.68, p 
= .43). 
The same mixed ANOVA was calculated for “happy.” Again, there was a significant 
main effect of Rating, F (4, 83) = 17.17, p < .001.  Bonferroni corrected post-hoc comparisons 
indicated that Level 3 (“moderately”) was endorsed significantly more often than Levels 1, 2, 
and 5 (all p’s < .05), and marginally more often than Level 4 (p =.07).  Next were Level 4 (“quite 
a bit”), Level 5 (“extremely”), and Level 2 (“a little”), all of which were endorsed significantly 
more often than Level 1 (all p’s < .05).  The main effect of Group and the interaction were not 
significant (Group: F (1, 34) = 1, p = .32); interaction: F (4, 83) = 1.44, p = .24).  
Overall, these results suggest that the groups did not differ in the manner in which they 
utilized the scale for rating their emotions.   
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Table 8:  Descriptive Data for the EMA Emotion Rating Scale 
 
  
Autism Group 
(N = 18) 
 
  
Control Group 
(N = 18) 
  
Mean 
 
(SD) 
 
Range 
 
  
Mean 
 
(SD) 
 
Range 
Global Negative Affect 
 
       
% Level 1 78.5 18.7 35-98  84.4 19.1 28-100 
% Level 2 14.0 12.4 0-43  12.2 16.4 0-59 
% Level 3 4.8 5.4 0-16  2.9 3.8 0-13 
% Level 4 1.7 2.8 0-11  0.5 0.7 0-2 
% Level 5 1.0 1.6 0-6  0 0.2 0-.1 
        
Happy         
% Level 1 1.7 1.9 0-6  1.0 1.7 0-4 
% Level 2 18.2 21.0 0-70  7.6 12.0 0-38 
% Level 3 39.6 26.7 0-92  47.8 27.5 0-93 
% Level 4 20.3 15.8 0-60  30.5 20.5 6-67 
% Level 5 20.2 27.7 0-97  13.1 26.2 0-91 
        
 
 
3.2.5 Relationship Between Child and Parent Reports 
To determine how parent ratings of their child’s affect compared to the child’s ratings on 
a given day, the percentage of each code for the “Level Match” variable was compared across 
groups for “angry,” “nervous,” “sad,” “upset,” and “happy.”  For each emotion, a mixed 
ANOVA of Group (Autism vs. Control) and Level Match (1 (Parent Rated Lower) vs. 2 (Parent 
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Rated Same) vs. 3 (Parent Rated Higher)) was conducted.  Means are presented in Figures 4A 
and 4B.   
There was no main effect of Group for any of the five tested emotions (for all: F (1, 34) = 
0; p = 0.98).   
For “angry,” there was a main effect of Level Match, F (2, 54) = 189.6; p < .001, with 
parents providing a “Same” rating significantly more often than a “Lower” rating or a “Higher” 
rating (p’s < .001).  Parents provided a “Higher” rating marginally more often than a “Lower” 
rating (p = .06).  The interaction of Diagnosis and Level Match was not significant, F (2, 54) = 
1.96; p = 0.16. 
For “nervous,” there was a also main effect of Level Match, F (2, 43) = 262.8; p < .001, 
with significantly more parent ratings of  “Same” than both “Lower” and “Higher” (p < .001). 
Parent ratings of “Higher” also occurred significantly more often than “Lower” (p < .01).  There 
was a trend towards significance in the Diagnosis by Level Match interaction, F (2, 43) = 2.68; p 
= .10.  Exploratory Bonferroni corrected post-hoc simple effects analysis indicated that parents 
of the autism group were significantly more likely than parents of the control group to provide a 
higher rating of “nervous” than their child did (p < .05). 
For “sad,” there was a main effect of Level Match, F (2, 52) = 261.5; p < .001.  Again, 
parents provided significantly more occurrences of “Same” ratings than both “Lower” and 
“Higher” ratings (p’s < .001).  The latter two ratings did not differ significantly from each other 
(p = .49).  The interaction of Diagnosis and Level Match was marginally significant, F (2, 52) = 
3.27; p = .06.  Exploratory Bonferroni corrected post-hoc simple effects analysis indicated that 
parents of the autism group were significantly more likely than parents of the control group to 
provide a higher rating of “sad” than their child did (p < .05). 
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For “upset,” there was a main effect of Level Match, F (2, 42) = 168.3; p < .001, but this 
was subsumed by a significant interaction of Diagnosis and Level Match, F (2, 42) = 9.91; p < 
.01.  Bonferroni corrected post-hoc simple effects analysis indicated that parents of the autism 
group were significantly more likely than parents of the control group to provide a higher rating 
of “upset” than their child did (p < .001), and significantly less likely than parents of the control 
group to provide the same rating of “upset” than their child did (p < .05). 
Finally, for “happy,” there was a main effect of Level Match, F (2, 67) = 8.77; p < .001.  
Following the pattern for negatively valenced emotions, parents provided significantly more 
occurrences “Same” ratings than both “Lower” and “Higher” ratings (p < .01).  The latter two 
ratings did not differ significantly from each other (p = 1.0).  The interaction of Diagnosis and 
Level Match was not significant, F (2, 42) = 0.55; p = .58. 
Overall, these data suggest that in general, parents of both groups were most likely to rate 
the intensity of their children’s affect, both positive and negative, at the same general level that 
their children did.  However, there was a consistent pattern of results suggesting that parents in 
the autism group, in contrast to control parents, were more likely to rate the intensity of their 
children’s negative affect, particularly for “sad” and “upset,” at a higher level than their children 
did.   
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Figure 4A.  Parent Rating Comparisons for Negative Emotions (*p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001)
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Figure 4B.  Parent Comparison Ratings for “Happy” (**p < .01; ***p < .001) 
3.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LABORATORY MEASURES AND IN SITU 
AFFECT 
3.3.1 Affective Understanding/Awareness and Social Behavior 
It was hypothesized that for both groups, affective understanding and awareness, 
measured both in the lab and in situ, would be related to social behavior. Measures of affective 
understanding and awareness that were of interest included 1) difficulty with cognitive 
processing of emotion (TAS-20 C scores), 2) ability to describe appropriate contexts for basic 
emotions in the lab, 3) ability to describe appropriate contexts for self-conscious emotions in the 
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lab, and 4) ability to describe appropriate contexts for basic emotions in situ.  Social competence 
measures of interest included both parent and child ratings on the SSRS.  Other than TAS-20 C 
scores and parent ratings on the SSRS, all other measures were non-normally distributed and 
could not be normalized.  For these measures, nonparametric correlations (Kendall’s tau) were 
utilized. Correlations are presented in Table 9.  
Overall, contrary to hypotheses, no measures of affective awareness and understanding 
were significantly related to parent or self-rated social skills in either group.   
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Table 9: Non-Parametric Correlation Matrix of Self-Rated Social Skills and Measures of Affective 
Awareness  
Autism Group (N = 19) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. +Age       
2. +SSRS Parent -.09      
3. SSRS Student -.03 .28     
4. +TAS-C-20 -.35 .03 -.02    
5. IL-ACB a -.15 -.18 .29 -.18   
6. IL-ACSC  b 
   
.08 .07 .09 .07 .08  
7. EMA-ACB c 
 
.16 -.14 .01 -.14 .16 -.13 
Control Group (N = 19) 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. +Age       
2. +SSRS Parent  -.06      
3. SSRS Student -.02 .37*     
4. +TAS-C-20 -.20 .02 -.31    
5. IL-ACB a .04 .03 -.13 -.20   
6. IL-ACSC  b 
   
-.04 .30 .29 -.02 -.21  
7. EMA-ACB c .33 .27 -.03 .29 -.20 .31 
Note:  * p ≤ .05 
 +Correlation between Age, SSRS Parent, and TAS-C-20 is Pearson’s R 
 a In-Lab: Appropriateness of Context Basic 
 b In-Lab: Appropriateness of Context Self Conscious 
c EMA: Appropriateness of Context Basic 
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3.3.2 In Situ Affect and Depression and Anxiety 
To investigate whether in situ reports of affect related to self- and parent-reports of 
depression and anxiety symptoms for both groups, a series of regression models were tested with 
self- and parent-reported CDI and SCARED scores as dependent measures of interest.  Predictors 
of interest included intensity and lability of global negative affect.  In addition, diagnosis was 
examined as a possible moderator of any relationship between the predictor and the outcome in 
question.  A log transformation was performed for intensity scores for Global Negative Affect to 
correct for skewness. Bivariate correlations between variables of interest are shown in Table 10.  
Analyses were conducted using centered variables.   
 
Table 10:  Correlation Matrix of Predictors of Depression and Anxiety 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Diagnosis a        
2. Age .17       
3. Child CDI .48** .34*      
4. Parent CDI .59** .21 .42**     
5. Child SCARED .56** .17 .51** .41*    
6. Parent SCARED .52** .18 .19 .73** .38*   
7. GNA Intensity b .25 .27 .53** .21 .37* .08  
8. GNA Lability b .39* .14 .57** .42* .37* .21 .85** 
Note:  N = 36 
 * p ≤ .05; ** p ≤ .01  
 a 0 = Control Group; 1 = Autism Group 
 b GNA = Global Negative Affect 
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3.3.2.1 In situ affect and depression     
Child report 
For child reported CDI scores, two separate regression models were tested, one for each 
predictor of interest.  In each case, current age and diagnosis were entered in Step 1, the predictor 
of interest was entered in Step 2, followed by the interaction of diagnosis and the predictor of 
interest in Step 3.  The respective models are presented in Table 11.   
After controlling for age and diagnosis, intensity of negative affect (β = .30, p < .05), and 
lability of global negative affect (β = .30, p < .05) emerged as significant predictors of child 
reported depressive symptoms in their respective models.  Both interactions of diagnosis and 
predictor were non-significant (all p’s ≥.13).     
Parent report 
For parent-reported CDI scores, the same two predictors of interest were entered into two 
separate regression models.  The respective models are presented in Table 12.  Both predictors 
and interactions of diagnosis and predictor were non-significant (all p’s ≥ .15).        
3.3.2.2 In situ affect and anxiety 
Child report 
As with CDI scores, two separate regression models were tested for child reported 
SCARED scores, one for each predictor of interest.  The respective models are presented in 
Table 13.  After controlling for age and diagnosis, all predictors and the interactions of diagnosis 
and predictor were non-significant (all p’s ≥ .13).    
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Parent report 
For parent-reported SCARED scores, the same two predictors of interest were entered 
into two separate regression models.  The respective models are presented in Table 14.  Both 
predictors and interactions of diagnosis and predictor were non-significant (all p’s ≥ .41).  
Overall, results from the regression models indicated that while intensity and lability of 
Global Negative Affect was related to child reported depression symptoms in both groups, these 
variables were not related to parent reports of child depression, or to parent or child reports of 
anxiety.   
 
Table 11:  Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting CDI-Child Scores from In Situ Child 
Emotion Ratings with Diagnosis as a Moderator (N = 36) 
 
 
  ß ∆R2 
Model 1    
    
Step 1 Age 
Diagnosis 
.26^ 
.47** 
.35*** 
    
Step 2 GNA Intensity a .30* .08* 
    
Step 3 Diagnosis x GNA Intensity -.18 .01 
 
Model 2 
   
    
Step 1 Age 
Diagnosis 
.26^ 
.47** 
.35*** 
    
Step 2 GNA Lability .30* .08* 
    
Step 3 Diagnosis x GNA Lability -.33 .04 
 
* p < .05; ** p < .01; + p = .08; ^ p = .1 
a GNA = Global Negative Affect     
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Table 12:  Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting CDI-Parent Scores from In Situ Child Emotion 
Ratings with Diagnosis as a Moderator (N = 36) 
 
  ß ∆R2 
Model 1    
    
Step 1 Age 
Diagnosis 
.05 
.63** 
.42*** 
    
Step 2 GNA Intensity a .04 .002 
    
Step 3 Diagnosis x GNA Intensity -.05 .001 
 
Model 2 
   
    
Step 1 Age 
Diagnosis 
.05 
.63** 
.42*** 
    
Step 2 GNA Lability .12 .03 
    
Step 3 Diagnosis x GNA Lability -.01 .001 
    
** p < .01 ; *** p < .001; a GNA = Global Negative Affect     
 
Table 13:  Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting SCARED-Child Scores from In Situ Child 
Emotion Ratings with Diagnosis as a Moderator (N = 36) 
 
  ß ∆R2 
Model 1    
    
Step 1 Age 
Diagnosis 
.11 
.52** 
.31** 
    
Step 2 GNA Intensity a .24 .05 
    
Step 3 Diagnosis x GNA Intensity -.25 .02 
 
Model 2 
   
    
Step 1 Age 
Diagnosis 
.11 
.52** 
.31** 
    
Step 2 GNA Lability .18 .03 
    
Step 3 Diagnosis x GNA Lability -.07 .002 
** p < .01; a GNA = Global Negative Affect     
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Table 14:  Hierarchical Regression Analysis Predicting SCARED-Parent Scores from In Situ Child 
Emotion Ratings with Diagnosis as a Moderator (N = 36) 
 
  ß ∆R2 
Model 1    
    
Step 1 Age 
Diagnosis 
.04 
.53*** 
.30** 
    
Step 2 GNA Intensity a -.07 .004 
    
Step 3 Diagnosis x GNA Intensity .12 .006 
 
Model 2 
   
    
Step 1 Age 
Diagnosis 
.04 
.53*** 
.30** 
    
Step 2 GNA Lability -.002 .001 
    
Step 3 Diagnosis x GNA Lability .14 .008 
    
    
 
*** p < .001 
a GNA = Global Negative Affect     
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4.0  DISCUSSION 
4.1 SUMMARY OF CURRENT RESULTS  
Clinical consensus and a limited number of empirical studies indicate that the 
understanding, awareness, and expression of personal emotional experiences are atypical in 
individuals with autism; however, the exact nature and magnitude of the atypicality is unclear.  
The purpose of the current study was to gain a better understanding of how individuals with 
autism understand and describe their own emotional experiences.  This study measured affective 
awareness and understanding both in the laboratory setting as well as in the individual’s natural 
environment. Using ecological momentary assessment (EMA), this study was the first to attempt 
to elucidate how adolescents with autism understand and describe their emotional experiences on 
a daily basis, and how this relates to their self-reports and emotion understanding performance in 
the lab. 
 This study had five specific aims.  The first was to replicate previous findings in the 
literature regarding the ability of individuals with autism to discuss the causes of their emotional 
experiences in the laboratory setting using an adolescent sample.  In line with hypotheses, 
individuals with autism had the most difficulty describing appropriate causal contexts for their 
self-conscious emotions. They had less difficulty describing appropriate causal contexts for their 
basic emotions, although they were not quite as proficient as controls. Their difficulties 
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describing appropriate causal contexts for their self-conscious emotions stood in contrast to their 
intact ability to describe appropriate causal contexts of non-emotional experiences, such as tired 
and hungry.  These findings provide further evidence that their deficits on this task were specific 
to emotion concepts, particularly to self-conscious emotions, and were not related to a general 
difficulty describing causal contexts.   
The hypothesis that individuals with autism would have difficulties providing specific, 
personalized causes of emotions was not supported.  Rather, there was a trend for them to 
provide a higher proportion of specific rather than nonspecific causes of their emotions, and they 
were no different from controls in the number of specific causes they provided overall.  Also 
contrary to hypotheses, individuals with autism were no more likely than controls to deny feeling 
a specific emotion or to fail to provide a cause for an emotion they endorsed as having 
experienced.   
The second aim of the current study was to determine whether the ability of individuals 
with autism to describe the causes of their emotions improved when they were probed in situ in 
contrast to in the lab. When reporting on the causes of their basic emotions in situ, individuals 
with autism, although not significantly worse than when probed in the lab, still showed a trend 
towards providing less appropriate causal contexts than controls did.  This suggests their ability 
to identify or interpret the causes of basic emotions, whether occurring in the past or in the 
moment, is somewhat less well developed than typically developing individuals. Although no 
differences were found between groups or setting for those individuals who endorsed 
experiencing self-conscious emotions in situ, these findings must be interpreted with extreme 
caution given the relatively low number of individuals who reported experiencing high intensity 
self-conscious emotions in situ.    
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The hypothesis that individuals with autism would provide a higher proportion of specific 
causes of emotions when probed in situ was partially supported.  Overall, the results suggested 
that while individuals with autism did benefit from being probed on the causes of their emotions 
in situ and were able to provide more specific, personalized responses, this was only clearly 
demonstrated for basic emotions. Additionally, this was not unique to their diagnosis, as the 
same benefit was conferred on the controls.  In the subgroup of individuals in both groups who 
reported experiencing high intensity self-conscious emotions in situ, there was no difference in 
their ability to provide specific, personalized causes when in the lab versus when probed in situ.  
As noted above, however, these findings must be interpreted with caution, given the notably 
reduced sample size that provided in situ data on high-intensity self-conscious emotions.  
It was also hypothesized that individuals with autism, when probed in situ, would be less 
likely than when probed in the lab to report that they did not know the cause of their emotions. 
Although the absolute number of individuals with autism reporting in situ that they did not know 
the cause of their emotional experience was no different from in the lab, the overall proportion of 
responses for which they could not provide a cause in situ was significantly lower, indicating that 
if they did endorse that they were experiencing a high intensity emotion, they were generally 
able to provide some cause for that emotion.    
  The third aim was to assess whether, in comparison to controls, individuals with autism 
reported experiencing the same number of discrete emotions over the course of two weeks, 
whether they endorsed experiencing emotions at the same frequency, and whether they provided 
any spontaneous reports of experiencing self-conscious emotions.  Contrary to expectations, 
individuals with autism reported experiencing more discrete emotions over the course of the 
study than controls did.  Also, while they endorsed a greater proportion of the basic emotions 
 78 
probed than the self-conscious emotions probed at a Level 2 or higher, spontaneous endorsement 
of self-conscious emotions was certainly not absent. Overall, the frequency with which they 
endorsed emotions at a Level 2 or higher, both for basic and self-conscious emotions, did not 
differ significantly from controls.  
The fourth aim was to examine the intensity and lability of reported affect over the two 
week study.  Although, on average, both groups reported generally low levels of negative affect, 
hypotheses were supported in that, overall, the intensity of negative affect reported by 
individuals with autism was significantly higher than that of controls.  The effect sizes for these 
findings, however, were generally small. As predicted, individuals with autism were also 
significantly more labile in their reports of negative affect.  This finding was emotion specific, 
with significantly more fluctuations than controls in their reports of “upset” and “sad,” but not 
“nervous” or “angry.”  Although no specific hypotheses were postulated, individuals with autism 
demonstrated more fluctuation than controls in their ratings of positive affect (“happy”).  
 There were two other findings of interest related to Aim 4.  First, individuals with autism 
used the rating scale for reporting of current affect in generally the same manner as controls.  
That is, they were no more likely overall to use the extreme ends of the scale, and no less likely 
to use the midpoint of the scale. Second, when parents of both groups were asked to reflect on 
their children’s emotional experiences, the parent ratings matched those provided by the child a 
majority of the time. A pattern did emerge, however, such that parents of the autism group were 
significantly more likely than parents of the control group to provide higher ratings of “sad,” 
“nervous,” and “upset” than their children did.  This finding was most pronounced for reports of 
“upset,” where over 20% of time, parents of the autism group rated their child’s experience of 
upset at a higher intensity than the child did.   
 79 
 The fifth aim was to ascertain if measures of affective awareness were related to either 
parent or child reported social behavior in either controls or individuals with autism. Contrary to 
expectations, results indicated no relationship between these measures for either group.    
The sixth aim was to examine the relationship between negative affect reported in situ 
and parent and child ratings of child anxiety and depression symptoms.  No relationship was 
found between indices of child negative affect and parent reports of child anxiety or depression.  
After controlling for age and diagnosis, intensity and lability of negative affect were significantly 
related to child reported depression symptoms, but not to child reported anxiety symptoms. 
Diagnosis did not significantly moderate any of these relationships.   
 Although not a specific aim of this study, several important findings emerged from the 
lab-based parent and child reports. First, groups differed on all measures, with the autism group 
reporting significantly higher levels of anxiety and depression, and the control group reporting 
significantly better social skills.  Second, across groups, parents endorsed more child depression 
symptoms than their children did, but the children reported higher levels of anxiety symptoms 
than their parents did.  Third, children in the autism group endorsed significantly higher social 
skills that their parents did, while in the control group, parent and child reports on child social 
skills did not differ.  Finally, while child and parent reports in the autism group were unrelated, 
in the control group they were significantly and positively associated for both child depression 
symptoms and child social skills.     
Together, the results of the current study provide evidence that in some ways, at least at 
the surface level, individuals with autism appear to understand and convey their emotional 
experiences, both in the lab and in their natural environments, in a manner similar to controls.  
Contrary to expectations, in the lab they were no more likely to deny feeling a particular emotion 
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and no less able to provide a cause for an emotion they endorsed.  In addition, the responses they 
provided were just as specific and personalized as those of controls. When reporting on their 
emotions in their natural environments, their use of the rating scale was not significantly 
different from controls, they endorsed experiencing some form of emotion just as frequently as 
controls did, and their general pattern of reporting for specific emotions was the same. Also, the 
strength and direction of the relationship between their reported affect in situ and their reports of 
depression symptoms in the lab was similar to controls. Finally, similar to controls, the majority 
of parents’ ratings of their children’s levels of affect in situ matched their children’s own ratings. 
Despite these similarities, a number of notable differences did emerge that provide important 
evidence to support the notion that the understanding, awareness, and expression of personal 
emotional experiences are different, and at times impaired, in individuals with autism.  
4.2 IDENTIFYING CAUSES OF OWN EMOTION 
4.2.1 Reporting Appropriate Causal Contexts 
Consistent with prior literature, individuals with autism were less adept than controls at 
describing appropriate causal contexts for their own emotions (Bauminger, 2004, Capps, et al., 
1992; Jaedicke, et al., 1994; Losh & Capps, 2006; Rieffe, et al., 2007).  This was true for both 
basic and self-conscious emotions, although their level of performance was only marginally 
worse than controls for basic emotions, but was significantly pronounced for self-conscious 
emotions.  In addition, although this difficulty was most evident in the lab setting, individuals 
with autism showed no clear evidence of improvement when discussing these emotions in situ.  
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Overall, they were no less likely than controls to endorse that they were feeling or had felt a 
particular emotion, thus their poor performance cannot be attributed to the fact that they were 
being asked to describe causes of emotions that they felt were unfamiliar to them. The question 
then, is if individuals with autism do believe they experience a broad range of emotions, what 
interferes with their ability to effectively describe appropriate causal contexts of these emotions 
when prompted? 
Widen and Russell’s (2003, 2010a, 2010b) Differentiation Model proposes that children 
initially understand emotions in broad mental categories (pleasure versus displeasure).  Through 
their experiences with observing varied facial expressions, noting contexts that elicit emotions, 
and connecting emotional experiences to the behaviors that result, children develop a script for 
each emotion, and their emotion categories gradually become more differentiated and adult-like.  
Since self-conscious emotions are difficult to recognize from facial expressions and require a 
strong self-evaluative component, it is more difficult to understand these emotions by only 
observing others, and thus children’s emotion scripts for self-conscious emotions should take 
longer for children to clearly differentiate from similarly valenced basic emotions.  Indeed, 
Widen and Russell (2010a) showed that through the age of six years, children are more likely to 
assimilate self-conscious emotions such as compassion, shame, and embarrassment into 
appropriately valenced basic-level categories, but by the age of nine, they are more able to 
differentiate them. 
Given the above model, children with autism are at a distinct disadvantage when it comes 
to developing emotion scripts.  A large body of work indicates that individuals with autism have 
difficulty processing faces (Dawson, Webb, & McPartland, 2005; Newell, Best, Gastgeb, Rump, 
& Strauss, 2010).  Young children with autism are significantly less adept than typically 
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developing peers at recognizing basic emotional expressions (Rump, Strauss, & Minshew, 2009), 
and even as adolescents and adults, they have more difficulty than controls at recognizing more 
complex, self-conscious expressions (Baron-Cohen, et al., 1997; Heery, et al., 2003).  In 
addition, given that understanding self-conscious emotions requires a clear differentiation of self 
from other (Tracy & Robins, 2004) as well as the ability to see oneself from the position of 
others (Lewis, et al., 1989), the role of theory of mind is thereby clearly implicated in the 
development of self-conscious emotion understanding (Wellman & Lagattuta, 2000).  Given the 
known deficits in theory of mind in individuals with autism, it is likely that this plays a 
contributing factor in their difficulties identifying and understanding self-conscious emotions, 
particularly when they are younger and theory of mind deficits are most prominent (Happe, 
1995). Finally, there is increasing evidence that individuals with autism have difficulty 
abstracting prototypical representations of categorical information (e.g., Gastgeb, Rump, Best, & 
Strauss, 2009; Klinger & Dawson, 2001), suggesting that even in the absence of emotion 
recognition and theory of mind deficits, their ability to abstract information from social scenarios 
in order to develop well differentiated emotion categories may be impaired.  These three deficits, 
in combination, could very likely cause individuals with autism to be delayed, at the least, in 
their ability to differentiate emotion categories.   
Results from the current study suggest that by the time they reach adolescence, 
individuals with autism are sufficiently capable of differentiating basic emotions in themselves 
such that they can usually provide at least one example of a time they experienced a particular 
emotion; however, they are not yet quite as proficient as controls.  Their ability to differentiate 
their own self-conscious emotions, however, is significantly less well developed, and given the 
additional demands inherent in differentiating self-conscious emotions, this is not surprising.  
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This was evident during the in-lab Emotional Experiences task, and also likely reflects the 
unexpected finding that when reporting on their emotions in situ, the individuals with autism 
endorsed experiencing a higher number of discrete self-conscious emotions than controls did.  It 
is important to note that for the Emotional Experiences task, their self-conscious emotion 
categories were clearly not atypical (reflected by the fact that overall, their mean scores were 
closer to a score of “3”, which represents a clearly differentiated causal explanation, than to a 
score of “1,” which represents more idiosyncratic responding), and that several individuals were 
at ceiling for this task and were able to provide appropriate causal contexts each time they were 
probed.  This suggests that some individuals with autism do have the capacity to reach “typical” 
levels of differentiation for self-conscious emotions.  While the current study found no 
association between performance on this measure and age or cognitive ability, future work 
should begin to examine these individual differences more closely to elucidate what factors 
contribute to more advanced emotion differentiation.   
4.2.2 Reporting Specific, Personalized Causes of Emotion 
While previous work has indicated that, when tested in the lab, individuals with autism 
are less able than controls to provide specific, personalized causes of their emotions (Bauminger, 
2004; Losh & Capps, 2006) and are more likely to deny having ever experienced an emotion 
(Rieffe, et al., 2007), these results were not found in the current study.  It is important to note that 
being probed in situ did provide an advantage to the individuals with autism in that if they 
endorsed experiencing a high intensity emotion, they were significantly less likely than when in 
the lab to deny knowing the cause of that emotion.  Being probed in situ also provided a clear 
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advantage for individuals with autism given the increased proportion of specific, personalized 
responses they provided.   
It was suggested that prior findings in individuals with autism may have been driven by 
poor autobiographical memory or memory for emotionally salient events (e.g., Bruck, et al., 
2007; Crane & Goddard, 2008; Gaigg & Bowler, 2009), and the current results provide some 
support for this given that they performed less well when having to recall emotional events rather 
than report on current emotional events.  However, given that in the current study, the overall 
pattern of results was the same for controls, albeit attenuated, it is unclear if these findings 
provide support for an in situ advantage that is specific to autism.  It is also possible that the in 
situ advantage for the individuals with autism was reflective of a different underlying difficulty 
that impacted their performance in the lab.  Since they only had to report on the causes of high 
intensity emotional events when probed in situ, it may be that their ability to link specific causes 
to particularly salient events is relatively intact, but if they were asked to identify what was 
causing them to feel “a little bit” sad, their responses may have been vaguer.  Similarly, although 
their performance in the lab was no different than controls, it is possible that they were able to 
recall one particularly salient event for some emotions and in turn provide a specific response, 
rather than selecting a response from one of many they could recall. A brief qualitative review of 
their responses provides some support for this notion: 
“I felt proud when I was in a concert in the 5th grade” (Participant A: currently in 10th 
grade) 
“When I was 5 years old I stole a bar of chocolate and I felt super guilty and started 
crying and stuff” (Participant B: currently 15 years old) 
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“When I was 5 and I got lost in the store, I was afraid” (Participant C: currently 15 years 
old) 
In contrast, no responses from the controls referenced a specific event that occurred when they 
were much younger.  Thus, although the individuals with autism in the current study were able to 
provide as many specific, personalized causes of emotions as controls when probed in the lab, 
this may explained by the possibility that, once individuals with autism reach adolescence, the 
nature of the current task is no longer sensitive enough to sufficiently tap into the underlying 
impairments in emotion concepts that emerged in prior studies. Future work should attempt to 
disentangle their ability to encode and recall specific exemplars of high intensity emotional 
events from their ability to reflect on their own emotional experiences in the context of well 
defined emotion concepts.  
4.3 REPORTING ON EMOTION IN SITU 
This was the first study to use EMA methodology with individuals with autism.  Results 
are encouraging in suggesting that this is a viable methodology to use with this population.  
Individuals with autism were just as likely to complete the protocol, averaged the same number 
of completed calls, and were willing to remain on the telephone for the same mean length of time 
as controls.  Anecdotally, parents of the individuals with autism were more likely to indicate that 
they had to remind their children to charge the phone each night and take it with them each day, 
although they did not report that this was an undue burden on them.   
Broadly, affective reports in situ of both the individuals with autism and the controls 
were consistent with previous work with individuals in a similar age range.  Both groups 
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reported generally low levels of negative affect (Axelson, et al., 2003; Haviland-Jones, et al., 
1997; Silk, et al., 2007), variable levels of positive affect (Axelson, et al., 2003; Haviland-Jones, 
et al., 1997), and rated their positive affect towards the middle of the scale’s range (Haviland-
Jones, et al., 1997, Larson & Lampman-Petraitis, 1989; Larson, et al., 2002). Given the relative 
similarities between the two groups and the general consistency with previous research, it 
appears as if the individuals with autism were not haphazard or erratic in their responding, and 
that their patterns of results and any respective divergence from controls can be given some 
credence.   
 The autism group differed from the control group in two important ways.  The first 
divergence was in the intensity of their reported affect.  Individuals in the autism group reported 
significantly higher levels of negative affect than controls.  This was not true for positive affect. 
The finding of slightly lower but statistically similar levels of positive affect, in contrast to 
higher levels of negative affect, indicates that the results cannot simply be attributed to the fact 
that individuals with autism provided higher intensity ratings for all emotions.  Also, although 
the overall magnitude of their negative affect was low and the effect sizes small, the divergence 
from the control group is notable.  While it does not capture the parental and clinical descriptions 
of “intense negative affect” in children with autism (Attwood, 2008; Capps, et al., 1993, Ricks & 
Wing, 1975), it does reflect some minimal awareness of a heightened level of negative affect in 
this group.  Based on daily parental report, however, there is some indication that the individuals 
with autism showed a pattern of under-reporting the intensity of their negative affect, particularly 
for reports of “upset” and “sad.”  Given that parent reports were retrospective and the design of 
the study could not ensure that parent and child were reporting on the same event, the finding of 
child underreporting in the autism group may be spurious. It is also possible that parents in the 
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autism group were over-reporting their children’s negative affect.  However, given that the 
general pattern of parent report results was the same for “sad,” “nervous,” and “upset,” but not 
for “angry,”  and also that there is an emerging finding in the literature that parents report higher 
levels of negative affect in their children with autism than the children themselves do (Lopata, et 
al., 2010; Mazefsky, et al., 2011), it is quite possible that this finding reflects a true impairment 
in the ability to accurately recognize the magnitude of one’s negative affect in the individuals 
with autism. 
 The second area of divergence from controls was in the lability of affect reported by the 
individuals with autism.  They were significantly more labile than controls in their reports of 
“upset,” “sad,” and “happy,” but not in their reports of “angry” and “scared.”  This again 
provides evidence that they were not simply more labile in their reporting of all emotions.  While 
the magnitude of their lability for each emotion did not reflect enormous fluctuations in affect 
across the week, the medium to large effect sizes indicate that the observed differences are 
noteworthy.  The finding is consistent with the clinical impression that individuals with autism, 
in contrast to controls, show significantly greater fluctuations in their negative affect on a day to 
day basis (e.g., Attwood, 2008), and it is the first to lend empirical support to this notion.  This 
data is also encouraging in that it indicates that, at least by adolescence, individuals with autism 
can perceive and report on varying levels of affect.  Although the accuracy of the intensity of that 
reporting is still unclear, it suggests they can introspect sufficiently to detect a change in their 
base level of affect.  Interestingly, data was consistent with previous work with typically 
developing populations showing that greater intensity and lability in negative affect was 
associated with higher levels of depressive symptoms (Costello, et al., 1991; Larson, et al., 1990; 
Silk, et al., 2003).  This relationship was upheld in the current study for child reports of 
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depressive symptoms, and a diagnosis of autism did not moderate this relationship.  This does 
not necessarily indicate that individuals with autism who are more labile have higher levels of 
depression, but more likely suggests that individuals with autism who are able to recognize some 
fluctuations in their affect on a daily basis are also somewhat more able to detect and report on 
symptoms associated with depression.     
Despite these encouraging findings, it is important to keep in mind that overall, the 
magnitude of fluctuations in negative affect, although significantly greater than controls, was still 
relatively small.  This could suggest that while individuals with autism are generally more labile 
than controls in adolescence, the more extreme fluctuations described anecdotally in the 
literature (e.g., Muller & Schuler, 2006; Ricks & Wing, 1975) are more apparent in younger 
children.  Alternatively, it may be that, as with intensity of emotion, individuals with autism are 
aware of fluctuations in their levels of negative affect, but are not skilled in interpreting the 
degree of this fluctuation.  Future work that takes a developmental approach and that examines 
how reported emotional lability relates to other indices of affect fluctuation, such as emotion 
regulation, can begin to address some of these questions. 
4.4 USE OF SELF-REPORT MEASURES 
Understanding how individuals with autism understand and report on their emotions is 
highly relevant to conceptualizing how to diagnose psychiatric comorbidities in this population. 
As the literature base continues to grow, there is increasing evidence that mood and anxiety 
disorders are highly comorbid with autism spectrum disorders (Stewart, et al., 2008; White, et 
al., 2009).  It is also established that, in typically developing individuals, correlations between 
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parent and child reports on child behavioral and emotional problems is low, at best, and that it is 
important to take into account both parent and child reports when evaluating for the presence of 
psychiatric comorbidities (e.g., Achenbach, McConaughy, & Howell, 1987; Jensen, et al., 1999). 
Thus, it is important to understand the implications of impaired emotional awareness and 
understanding in individuals with autism on how they report on their own mood and anxiety 
symptoms.   
Findings in the current study regarding reports of symptoms of depression were generally 
consistent with previous literature.  Parents of children with autism reported higher levels of 
depression symptoms in their children than control parents did (Lopata, et al., 2010; Nicpon, 
Doobay, & Assouline, 2010), and were more likely to endorse “at risk” levels of child depression 
than their children were (Lopata, et al., 2010, Nicpon, et al., 2010; Mazefsky, et al., 2011).  In 
addition, parent and child reports in the autism group were not correlated (Mazefsky, Oswald, & 
Lainhart, 2008).  In contrast to previous studies, the children in the autism group reported higher 
levels of depressive symptoms than the children in the control group.  However, this was not 
driven by the individuals in the autism group reporting above average levels of depression, but 
rather was attributed to below average levels of depressive symptoms reported in the control 
group; thus, overall levels of depressive symptoms reported by the autism group were consistent 
with previous work (Lopata, et al., 2010; Nicpon, et al., 2010).  Previous studies have attributed 
lower child than parent ratings of depression to a lack of awareness of internal emotional signals.  
Current results from in situ affective reports suggest that perhaps there is not a complete lack of 
awareness, but rather difficulty interpreting the intensity of the emotional experience.  Thus, if 
symptoms of depression are only mildly elevated, then while they may be apparent to parents, 
they may be less discernable or relevant to the individuals with autism. The finding that intensity 
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of negative affect in situ predicted to depression symptoms reported in the lab provides some 
support for this notion and suggests, as discussed earlier, that perhaps individuals with autism 
who are more able to recognize and report on the intensity of their emotions on a day to day 
basis are also more able to recognize and report on more subtle levels of depressive symptoms.   
Results from the anxiety measures were somewhat similar in that again, parents of 
children with autism endorsed higher levels of child anxiety than control parents did (e.g., 
Lopata, et al., 2010, Weisbrot, Gadow, DeVincent, & Pomeroy, 2005).  As with depression 
symptoms, the individuals with autism endorsed significantly higher levels of anxiety than 
controls.  In contrast to the findings with the depression reports, this difference was not just due 
to reports of lower than average anxiety in the controls, but rather due to particularly high levels 
of reported anxiety in the individuals with autism.  The literature indicates that individuals with 
autism may be generally more aware of their anxiety symptoms than their depressive symptoms 
(Mazefsky, et al., 2010), and they have been shown to report levels of anxiety that that are 
comparable to typically developing individuals with anxiety disorders (e.g., Farrugia & Hudson, 
2006; Russell & Sofronoff, 2005).  What was surprising, however, was that the children with 
autism reported significantly higher levels of anxiety than even their parents did, which is 
inconsistent with prior findings.  While this may reflect a tendency for the children to over report 
on lab-based measures, it stands in contrast to their pattern of reporting for depression symptoms.  
Also, while this could be attributed to an artifact of the measured used, the only published study 
utilizing the SCARED with this population indicated higher parent than child ratings (Reaven, et 
al., 2009).  Finally, this could be a reflection of the age of the current sample (previous studies 
showing higher parent than child reports of anxiety had samples with individuals in the 10 to 13 
year range).  Perhaps anxiety symptoms in individuals with autism at this age are significantly 
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more prominent or physiologically based than depression symptoms, and by virtue of the fact 
that these symptoms are more perceptible to them, they may be more aware of them and thus 
interpret and report them as being high intensity.  The finding in both groups of a significant 
positive relationship between difficulty with cognitive processing of emotions and levels of 
reported child anxiety provide some support for this conjecture.  This suggests that individuals 
who are less able to cognitively reflect on their affect may use other indices to determine how 
they are feeling, thus they may be more aware of any physiological arousal associated with 
anxiety and in turn rate it as occurring more frequently.  Of note, however, is that their in situ 
reports of feeling “nervous” were low and stable.  It is possible that they did not link term 
“nervous” with the same experiences they endorsed on the SCARED (e.g., “I worry about being 
as good as other kids;” “ I get stomach aches at school”), and that these experiences are better 
reflected in their ratings of “upset.”  Even so, the intensity and lability of negative affect reported 
in situ was not significantly related to their in-lab reports of anxiety.  Thus, whatever factors led 
to the high levels of anxiety reported in the lab do not appear to consistently influence their 
reporting of affect on a day to day basis. Further work examining awareness of anxiety in 
adolescents with autism is clearly warranted. 
Results from the current study support previous work that suggests that self-reports of 
individuals with autism on their behavioral and emotional difficulties must be interpreted with 
caution, as they may, particularly for depression, underestimate true symptoms levels.  However, 
the data also suggest that relying on parent reports alone is not sufficient, as they may fail to 
capture a child’s perceived level of distress.  Thus, as with typically developing individuals, it 
will continue to be important to evaluate both parent and child reports until we have a firmer 
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grasp on the relationship between symptom expression and symptom report in individuals with 
autism.    
4.5 AWARENESS OF AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE AND AFFECTIVE SOCIAL 
COMPETENCE 
The affective social competence model predicts that awareness and identification of one’s 
own affective experience is positively related to proficiency in social interaction.  Previous work 
has found support for the affective social competence model in typically children using a variety 
of measures (for a review see Trentacosta & Fine 2010).  In addition, it has been shown that 
individuals with autism who were better at “receiving” affective signals (i.e., recognizing facial 
expressions of emotion) had higher social functioning by parent report (e.g., Garcia-Villamisar, 
Rojajn, Zaja, & Jodra, 2010; Stichter, et al., 2010).  As such, it was predicted that measures of 
affective awareness collected during this study would predict to concurrent social competence. 
Although groups differed on many of the measures of interest (e.g., individuals with autism 
performed worse on the in-lab appropriateness of contexts tasks; individuals with autism 
reported higher TAS-20 C scores suggesting more difficulty with cognitive processing of 
emotion; controls and their parents reported higher social skills), the current study found no 
relationship between any measures of affective awareness and understanding and either parent-  
or self-reported social skills for both groups.   
The current findings should not be taken as evidence that the affective social competence 
model is not relevant to the autism population, and rather that the measures used in the current 
study were not able to capture the skills relevant to adolescent affective social competence.  
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First, the relatively restricted range of scores on the appropriateness of context tasks, in 
conjunction with a small sample size, may be insufficient to discriminate within group 
differences.  It is also possible that many of the prosocial skills assessed by the SSRS (e.g., 
ability to cooperate with family rules, ability to initiate conversations, ability to demonstrate 
regard for others property) are less susceptible to emotion awareness difficulties tapped by the 
appropriateness of context tasks and the TAS-20 C.  Perhaps measures that better capture levels 
of social-emotion awareness and reciprocity, such as the Social Responsiveness Scale 
(Constantino & Todd, 2003) would be able to better elucidate potential relationships between the 
current affective awareness measures and parent report of daily social functioning.   
4.6 LIMITATIONS 
The current study, although adding to our understanding of how individuals with autism 
report on their affective experiences, has several limitations.  First, the sample size was small and 
limited the power to detect relevant relationships between variables and significant differences 
between groups.  In addition, there is growing awareness of important significant intragroup 
variation in the autism population, but the small sample size did not allow for adequate 
exploration at the subgroup level.  Second, there is a possibility of selection bias for the autism 
group.  Individuals with autism who were either uncomfortable talking on the phone or who were 
averse to discussing their emotions may have been less willing to participate in the study, thus 
the data might not be representative of those who have the most difficulty reporting on their 
affect.  Third, participants in the autism group were all high functioning. As such, the current 
results may not be representative of individuals with autism who have cognitive impairments.  
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Fourth, this study did not measure and account for the potential effects of social skills 
intervention in the autism group.  Professionals and parents are often aware of the difficulties 
that individuals with autism exhibit in emotion understanding and expression, thus it is possible 
that some individuals in the autism group may have received targeted intervention in emotion 
understanding at some point prior to enrolling in the study.  If so, these individuals may have 
been able to describe their emotions more effectively than individuals who did not receive any 
such intervention.  Fifth, with only one parent completing the in-lab measures, there was no way 
to account for the possibility of over- or under-reporting.  Sixth, although this study demonstrates 
significantly more ecological validity than previous studies, the restriction that calls could only 
occur outside of school hours limits our understanding of their emotional experiences during the 
school day where there is the potential for a number of emotionally evoking situations (e.g., 
difficulties with peers). Seventh, we did not systematically investigate the relevance of missed 
calls. It is possible that calls were not answered, particularly for the individuals with autism, if 
they occurred during moments of intense affect (e.g., during a “meltdown” or an “anxiety 
attack”).  Thus, we may have missed the opportunity to capture peak affective experiences in the 
moment.  Finally, the method by which parent reports were collected in situ was susceptible to 
error.  Given that parent calls occurred at the end of each day, parents may not have been able to 
accurately recall the exact time of day at which the event they were describing occurred, 
particularly on weekends when the parent was asked to recall events that had occurred over a 
whole day rather than an afternoon.  As such, there may have been instances when a parent 
report was inadvertently compared to the incorrect child report.      
 95 
4.7 FUTURE DIRECTIONS 
This study took the first step in examining how individuals with autism understand and 
report on their affective experiences on a day to day basis, and how this relates to performance 
on in-lab and self-report measures.  As such, it raises a number of unanswered questions and 
avenues for future research.  First, it will be important to conduct further work in this area using 
larger samples.  Autism symptomotology is incredibly heterogeneous, and the influence of 
specific underlying genetic and neurological profiles continues to elude researchers.  Larger 
samples would allow us to explore individual differences in emotion processing skills, increase 
our potential to identify factors associated with deficits in this area, and perhaps intervene on a more 
individualized level.  
 Second, future work should strive to take a developmental approach.  Previous work in 
another domain relevant to affective social competence, (i.e., emotion recognition) has demonstrated 
that the degree of impairment in individuals with autism relative to controls is related to 
developmental level and is more subtle in adolescence and adulthood (Rump, Strauss, & Minshew, 
2009).  Thus, it will be important to use consistent methodological techniques in child, adolescent, 
and adult groups in order to systematically explore how impairments in emotion understanding and 
awareness manifest at different ages.  
Third, it will be important to design tasks to test emotion awareness and understanding that 
are more difficult and in turn make the use of compensatory strategies less successful.  As discussed 
earlier, individuals with autism may be able to recall particularly high intensity emotional events, and 
in turn perform well on task where they can discuss them, yet still have generally poorly developed 
emotion categories.  Perhaps if they had been asked to provide several examples of when they had 
experienced a particular emotion, specific deficits would have been more pronounced.       
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Fourth, future studies should employ multiple informants for each measure in order to better 
understand potential systematic over- or under-reporting that may occur.  Teachers would be a 
particularly good source of information given that they are more likely to see a broader sampling of 
“typical” behavior than many parents might, and as a result have a better metric by which to judge 
certain characteristics, such as social skills.  In addition, symptoms of anxiety may be more likely to 
manifest in a school setting giving the constantly shifting task demands and social environment.  As 
such, teachers may be able to provide unique insights into a child’s apparent levels of anxiety.  
Sixth, given the apparent underreporting by individuals with autism in most affective 
domains assessed in situ, the need for corresponding parent reports is tantamount.  It will be 
important not only to acquire more frequent parent reports, but also to develop methods to ensure 
more accurate temporal relationships between reports.   One strategy could be to prompt parents (by 
beeper or some other noninvasive measure) to complete a report on their child’s current affect at the 
same time their child receives each call.  In this way, accuracy of both intensity and lability can be 
examined more closely.    
Finally, it is clear that ecological momentary assessment is a promising methodology for 
future use in this population.  Not only do the data present a more ecologically valid representation of 
how individuals with autism report on their affect on a day to day basis, but the nature of the  
repeated sampling allowed us to detect important differences between groups that could never be 
captured in one or even several lab visits.  Given the rich nature of the data that can be collected 
using EMA methodology, it will now be important to examine more closely the correlates of 
affective reports. Previous work in typically developing populations has indicated that valence and 
intensity of affect varies with the social context (i.e., alone, with friends, with parents) (Larson & 
Richards, 1991) and the environmental contexts (i.e., school, home, other) (Schneiders, et al., 2007).  
Understanding how context influences the reports of individuals with autism will further enhance our 
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understanding of their affective experiences and will also provide valuable information for 
conceptualizing treatment plans.   
4.8 CONCLUSIONS 
Almost sixty years after Kanner first characterized autism, clinicians and researchers are 
still trying to understand the “disturbance of affective contact” that so clearly captures the social 
nature of these individuals, yet is so difficult to operationalize and quantify.  The current study 
indicates that even by adolescence, the ways in which individuals with autism understand, 
experience, and report on their emotions differs from their typically developing peers.  Results 
suggest they have less-well-defined emotion concepts, particularly for self-conscious emotions. 
Additionally, when their affective experiences are sampled in an ecologically valid way, it 
appears that, in general, they experience more intense and labile negative affect than their 
typically developing peers, although the degree of this intensity and lability is still unclear.  
Many of the ways in which they differ from their typically developing peers are seemingly 
subtle, and even when using sensitive and ecologically valid methodology, the true the 
magnitude of these differences is difficult to capture.  As such, it is likely that none of these 
impairments, in isolation, play a substantial role in impaired affective-social competence.  
However, as the effects of less-well-defined emotion concepts, lower attunement to the intensity 
of emotion, more labile affect, and less awareness of internal emotion signals converge, the daily 
impact on social-emotional reciprocity may become significant.  Thus, while the current study is 
another step towards quantifying the “emotional deficit” in autism that was indentified over half 
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a decade ago, further work is urgently needed to help guide parents and professionals toward a 
better understanding of this component of the autistic experience.        
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APPENDIX A 
EMOTION DEFINITIONS 
from Losh & Capps, 2006 
Happy: glad, cheery 
Sad: unhappy 
Angry: mad 
Afraid: scared, frightened 
Nervous: anxious, worried 
Proud: pleased with yourself, happy about something you did well 
Embarrassed: humiliated, self-conscious, making a mistake 
Guilty: doing something wrong or bad 
Tired: sleepy 
Sick: ill, not healthy 
Hungry: really want to eat food 
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APPENDIX B 
CODING KEY FOR EMOTIONAL EXPERIENCES 
1) Specific vs. Non-specific cause 
0 = Don’t know/no response 
1 = Non-specific (no clear reference to a specific event) 
Examples: “birthday parties make me happy” 
  “I’m was sad when people died” 
2 = Specific (focus on a specific past event) 
Examples: “I was sad when my dog died” 
  “I was mad when I got a bad grade” 
 
2) Appropriateness of Causal Context 
0 = Don’t know/no response 
1 = Incorrect/inappropriate context (actions and events that, without further 
explanation, would not typically elicit the emotion in question) 
Examples: “I was sad one time when I got a birthday present” 
  “Hammers make me angry” 
  “I felt tired when my mom hugged me” 
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2 = Context with appropriate valance (episodes that would tend to elicit feelings of 
appropriate valance but do not contain sufficient details or explanation for distinguishing the 
specific emotion from similarly valenced feelings) 
Examples: “I was proud when my mom gave me a present” 
  “I was guilty when my dog died” 
  “I was afraid when people made fun of me” 
3 = Appropriate context (references describing unambiguously evocative contexts) 
Examples: “I was happy when I went to the zoo with my friends yesterday” 
  “I was proud when I won the spelling bee” 
  “I was sick last year when I had the flu” 
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APPENDIX C 
CHILD EMA SCRIPT 
Adapted from Axelson, et al., 2003 & Silk, et al., 2007 
 
Hi, NAME, this is ____________ from the University of Pittsburgh.  Is this a good time to 
answer a few questions? 
 
If YES – begin; If NO – ok, how long until I should call you back?   
 
Current Feelings 
Ask on every call 
 
I am going to ask you some questions about how you were feeling when the 
phone rang.  Use the 1-5 scale and the thermometer on the back of your phone 
to tell me how you are feeling: 
1. How happy
*
 (good, satisfied) are you?  1   2   3   4   5 
2. How sad
*
 (unhappy) are you?  1   2   3   4   5 
3. How nervous
*
 (worried, anxious) are you?  1   2   3   4   5 
 
4. How upset (agitated, distressed) are you?  1   2   3   4   5 
5. How angry
*
 (mad) are you?  1   2   3   4   5 
 
6. How lonely (feeling sad/bad because you’re alone) are you?  1   2   3   4   5 
7. How proud
*
 (pleased and happy with yourself or someone else because you/they did something 
good) are you?    1   2   3   4   5 
8. How scared
*
 (frightened, afraid) are you?  1   2   3   4   5 
9. How guilty
*
 (feeling bad because you did something you shouldn’t have) are you?  1   2   3   
4   5 
10. How embarrassed
*
 (self-conscious) are you?  1   2   3   4   5 
 
1 = not at all 
2 = a little 
3 = moderately 
4 = quite a bit 
5 = extremely 
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*Probe: 
If they rate happy, sad, nervous, angry, scared, proud, embarrassed, or guilty a 4 or 5: 
 
11. A. You said you were feeling {quite a bit/extremely} ____________.  What made you feel 
that way? 
 
 
B. You said you were feeling {quite a bit/extremely} ____________.  What made you feel 
that way? 
 
 
C. You said you were feeling {quite a bit/extremely} ____________.  What made you feel 
that way? 
 
 
D. You said you were feeling {quite a bit/extremely} ____________.  What made you feel 
that way? 
 
 
Current Activity 
 
12. At the moment the phone rang, what were you doing? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
13. A. Where were you {current activity}?    
 
 
B. How long have you been {current activity}? 
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14. Were you interacting with anyone when the phone rang?  YES  NO 
 
Who? 
 
In what way were you interacting (in person, on telephone, on computer)? 
 
 
 
A. If they were interacting with someone on #14: 
 
Were you {current activity} together when the phone rang?  YES NO 
 
 
Most Negative and Positive – Past Hour 
Ask on every call 
 
15. Try to remember your feelings and thoughts over the past hour (so, between XX and 
now).  Think about the time when you felt the worst, or the most negative (e.g., mad, 
upset, nervous, disappointed, sad, worried).  What happened?  
 
 
 
16. When was it? 
 
 ___right before I was called = 1 
___about 15 minutes ago = 2 
___about 30 minutes ago = 3 
___about 45 minutes ago = 4 
___about 1 hour ago = 5 
 
 
A. At the worst point, how angry did you feel?   1   2   3   4   5 
B. At the worst point, how nervous did you feel?  1   2   3   4   5 
C. At the worst point, how sad did you feel?  1   2   3   4   5 
D. At the worst point, how upset did you feel?   1   2   3   4   5 
 
1 = not at all 
2 = a little 
3 = moderately 
4 = quite a bit 
5 = extremely 
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17. Now think about the best or happiest time in the past hour. 
 (e.g., happy, excited, relaxed).  What happened?  
 
 
18. When was it? 
 
 ___right before I was called = 1 
___about 15 minutes ago = 2 
___about 30 minutes ago = 3 
___about 45 minutes ago = 4 
___about 1 hour ago = 5 
 
19.  
A. At the best point, how happy did you feel?  1   2   3   4   5 
 
 
Worry 
Ask on every call 
 
20. A. Were you were worrying about anything before the phone rang.  If nothing, see question 
21. 
W1 
 
Is there anything else you were worrying about? 
W2 
 
Is there anything else you were worrying about? 
W3 
 
Is there anything else you were worrying about? 
W4 
 
 
B. How worried were you about {worry}? 
  W1 
  W2 
W3 
W4 
 
 
21. (Ask only if nothing for question 20) What have you been thinking about? 
 
 
 
1 = not at all 
2 = a little 
3 = moderately 
4 = quite a bit 
5 = extremely 
1 = not at all 
2 = a little 
3 = moderately 
4 = quite a bit 
5 = extremely 
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Ask only on the last call of every day 
 
Enjoyable Experiences 
 
22. A. What was the best thing that happened to you today? 
 
 
 
 
B. At the best moment, how enjoyable was {enjoyable event} for you? (Circle Answer) 
 
   Enjoyable 1      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
23. Did you go to school today? 
 
1 = yes     5 = sick 
2 = weekend    6 = just not going 
3 = school holiday   7 = home schooled 
4 = doctors/dentist appointment   8 = summer vacation 
 
 
24. Will you go to school tomorrow? 
 
1 = yes     5 = sick 
2 = weekend    6 = just not going 
3 = school holiday   7 = home schooled 
4 = doctors/dentist appointment   8 = summer vacation 
 
 
25. Any after school or extracurricular activities: 
 
1 = sporting activity   4 = detention 
2 = academic    5 = other extracurricular activity 
3 = social (football game/dance/etc) 6 = none 
1 = not at all 
2 = a little 
3 = moderately 
4 = quite a bit 
5 = extremely 
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APPENDIX D 
PARENT EMA QUESTIONNIARE 
Please think back on your child’s emotional experiences between the hours of ____ and ____. 
 
On a scale of 1 to 5, where 1 is “not at all,” 2 is “a little,” 3 is “moderately,” 4 is “quite a bit,” and 5 
is “extremely,” did your child experience any of the following emotions at a level of 4 or 5? 
 
1. Happy? NO YES If YES, was it at  LEVEL 4 LEVEL 5 
 
What happened to cause this?______________________________________________________ 
 
 
Around what time today did this happen?____________________________________________ 
 
Was “Name” with anyone when he was feeling this way?      NO          YES 
 
If YES, who was “Name” with?____________________________________________________ 
 
 
Repeat for: 
 
2. Sad  
3. Angry   
4. Nervous  
5. Upset   
6. Scared  
7. Proud  
8. Embarrassed  
9. Guilty  
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APPENDIX E 
SCREEN FOR CHILD ANXIETY RELATED EMOTIONAL DISORDERS 
(SCARED) SCALE 
Birmaher, et al., 1997 
 
Please read the following statements and circle that response that best describes you: 
 
                    Not True    Sometimes True   Often True 
(0)           (1)  (2) 
 
1. When I feel frightened, it is hard for me to breathe   0 1 2 
             
2. I get headaches when I am at school     0 1 2 
 
3. I do not like to be with people I do not know well   0 1 2 
 
4. I get scared if I sleep away from home     0 1 2 
    
5. I worry about other people liking me     0 1 2 
 
6. When I get frightened, I feel like passing out    0 1 2 
 
7. I am nervous         0 1 2 
 
8.  I follow my mother or father wherever they go    0 1 2 
 
9.  People tell me I look nervous      0 1 2 
 
10. I feel nervous with people I don’t know well     0 1 2 
 
11. I get stomachaches at school      0 1 2 
 
12. When I get frightened, I feel like I am going crazy    0 1 2  
       
13. I worry about sleeping alone      0 1 2 
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Not True    Sometimes True   Often True 
(0)           (1)  (2) 
 
14. I worry about being as good as other kids    0 1 2 
 
15. When I get frightened, I feel like things are not real   0 1 2 
 
16. I have nightmares about something bad happening to my parents 0 1 2 
 
17. I worry about going to school      0 1 2 
 
18. When I get frightened, my heart beats fast    0 1 2 
 
19. I get shaky         0 1 2 
         
20. I have nightmares about something bad happing to me   0 1 2 
 
21. I worry about things working out for me     0 1 2 
 
22. When I get anxious, I sweat a lot      0 1 2 
 
23. I am a worrier        0 1 2 
 
24. I get really frightened for no reason at all    0 1 2 
      
25. I am afraid to be alone in the house     0 1 2 
 
26. It is hard for me to talk to people I don’t know well   0 1 2 
 
27. When I get frightened, I feel like I am choking    0 1 2 
 
28. People tell I that I worry too much     0 1 2 
 
29. I do not like to be away from my family     0 1 2 
 
30. I am afraid of having anxiety (or panic) attacks    0 1 2 
 
31. I worry that something bad might happen to my parents   0 1 2 
 
32. I feel shy with people I don’t know well     0 1 2 
 
33. I worry about what is going to happen in the future   0 1 2 
 
34. When I get frightened, I feel like throwing up    0 1 2 
 
35. I worry about how well I do things     0 1 2 
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Not True    Sometimes True   Often True 
(0)           (1)  (2) 
 
36. I get scared to go to school      0 1 2 
 
37. I worry about things that have already happened    0 1 2 
 
38. When I get frightened, I feel dizzy     0 1 2 
 
39. I feel nervous when I am with other children and I   0 1 2 
      have to do something while they watch me (for example: read  
     aloud, speak, play a game, play a sport) 
 
40. I feel nervous about going to parties, dances, or any place  0 1 2 
      where there will be people that I don’t know well 
 
41. I am shy         0 1 2   
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APPENDIX F 
SCREEN FOR CHILD ANXIETY RELATED EMOTIONAL DISORDERS 
(SCARED) SCALE -- PARENT 
Birmaher, et al., 1997 
 
Please read the following statements and circle that response that best describes your child: 
 
                    Not True    Sometimes True   Often True 
(1)           (1)  (2) 
 
8. When my child feels frightened, it is hard for him/her to breathe 0 1 2 
             
9. My child gets headaches when he/she is at school   0 1 2 
 
10. My child does not like to be with people he/she does not know well 0 1 2 
 
11. My child gets scared if he/she sleeps away from home   0 1 2 
    
12. My child worries about other people liking him/her   0 1 2 
 
13. When my child gets frightened, he/she feels like passing out  0 1 2 
 
14. My child is nervous        0 1 2 
 
8.  My child follows us wherever we go     0 1 2 
 
9.  People tell my child he/she looks nervous    0 1 2 
 
10. My child feels nervous when with people he/she does not know well  0 1 2 
 
11. My child gets stomachaches at school     0 1 2 
 
12. When my child gets frightened, he/she feels like he/she is going  0 1 2  
      crazy 
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Not True    Sometimes True   Often True 
(0)           (1)  (2) 
 
13. My child worries about sleeping alone     0 1 2 
 
14. My child worries about being as good as other kids   0 1 2 
 
15. When my child gets frightened, he/she feels like things are not real 0 1 2 
 
16. My child has nightmares about something bad happening to us  0 1 2 
 
17. My child worries about going to school     0 1 2 
 
18. When my child gets frightened, his/her heart beats fast   0 1 2 
 
19. My child gets shaky       0 1 2 
                    
20. My child has nightmares about something bad happing to him/her 0 1 2 
 
21. My child worries about things working out for him/her   0 1 2 
 
22. When my child gets anxious, he/she sweats a lot    0 1 2 
 
23. My child is a worrier       0 1 2 
 
24. My child gets really frightened for no reason at all   0 1 2 
      
25. My child is afraid to be alone in the house    0 1 2 
 
26. It is hard for my child to talk to people he/she doesn’t know well 0 1 2 
 
27. When my child gets frightened, he/she feels like he/she is choking 0 1 2 
 
28. People tell my child that he/she worries too much   0 1 2 
 
29. My child does not like to be away from his/her family   0 1 2 
 
30. My child is afraid of having anxiety (or panic) attacks   0 1 2 
 
31. My child worries that something bad might happen to us  0 1 2 
 
32. My child feels shy with people he/she doesn’t know well  0 1 2 
 
33. My child worries about what is going to happen in the future  0 1 2 
 
34. When my child gets frightened, he/she feels like throwing up  0 1 2 
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Not True    Sometimes True   Often True 
(0)           (1)  (2) 
 
35. My child worries about how well he/she does things   0 1 2 
 
36. My child gets scared to go to school     0 1 2 
 
37. My child worries about things that have already happened  0 1 2 
 
38. When my child gets frightened, he/she feels dizzy   0 1 2 
 
39. My child feels nervous when he/she is with other children and he/she 0 1 2 
      has to do something while they watch him/her (for example: read  
     aloud, speak, play a game, play a sport) 
 
40. My child feels nervous about going to parties, dances, or any place 0 1 2 
      where there will be people the he/she doesn’t know well 
 
41. My child is shy        0 1 2   
 
 
 114 
APPENDIX G 
THE TORONTO ALEXITHYMIA SCALE – 20 FOR CHILDREN 
Rieffe, Oosterveld, & Meerum Terwogt, 2006 
 
 
Please read the following statements and circle that response that best describes you: 
 
1. I am often confused about the way I feel inside             Not True   A Bit True   True 
 
2. I find it difficult to say how I feel inside              Not True   A Bit True   True 
 
3. I feel things in my body that even doctors don’t understand      Not True   A Bit True   True 
 
4. I can easily say how I feel inside               Not True   A Bit True   True 
 
5. When I have a problem, I want to know where is comes            Not True   A Bit True   True 
      from and not just talk about it 
6. When I am upset, I don’t know if I’m sad, scared, or angry       Not True   A Bit True   True 
 
7. I am often puzzled by things I feel in my body              Not True   A Bit True   True 
 
8. I’d rather wait and see what happens, instead of thinking          Not True   A Bit True   True  
about why things happen 
9. Sometimes I can’t find the words to say how I feel inside          Not True   A Bit True   True 
 
10. It is important to understand how you feel inside            Not True   A Bit True   True 
 
11. I find it hard to say how I feel about other people            Not True   A Bit True   True 
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12. Other people tell me I should talk more about              Not True   A Bit True   True 
how I feel inside 
13. I don’t know what’s going on inside me                         Not True   A Bit True   True 
 
14. I often don’t know why I am angry              Not True   A Bit True   True 
 
15. I prefer talking to people about everyday things, rather            Not True   A Bit True   True 
 than about how they feel 
16. I prefer watching funny television shows, rather than             Not True   A Bit True   True 
      shows that tell a story about other people’s problems 
17. It is difficult for me to say how I really feel inside,             Not True   A Bit True   True 
      even to my best friend 
18. I can feel close to someone, even when we are sitting still         Not True   A Bit True   True  
      and not saying anything 
19. Thinking about how I feel helps me when I want to do             Not True   A Bit True   True 
      something about my problems 
20. When I have to concentrate on a movie to understand            Not True   A Bit True   True  
      the story, I enjoy the movie much less.  
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APPENDIX H 
SAMPLE OF PARTICIPANT REPSONSES FROM THE EMOTIONAL 
EXPERIENCES TASK 
 
Appropriateness of Context: 
2 Point Descriptions: 
BASIC 
• “I felt sad the first few days of 4th grade when I had to meet new people” (sad; autism 
group; 15 years old) 
• “The other day I made a substance called Gobbledy Goo and the composite just didn’t 
come out right” (sad; autism group; 16 years old) 
• “When this kid at school starts to talk about porn and stuff” (angry, autism group; 15 
years old) 
• “When I first met my grandparents” (afraid; control group; 15 years old) 
 
SELF-CONSCIOUS  
• “I’m proud when I clean the house” (proud; autism group; 13 years old) 
• “I’m proud at my family” (proud; autism group; 17 years old) 
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• “I was embarrassed when I accidentally broke something special” (embarrassed; autism 
group; 13 years old) 
• “I was embarrassed when I accidentally came home late” (embarrassed; autism group; 12 
years old) 
• “I felt guilty when I hanged [sic] out with the wrong types of friends” (guilty; autism 
group; 17 years old) 
• “I feel guilty when I’m clumsy” (guilty; autism group; 14 years old) 
• “When my brother accidentally got a nail in his foot and I didn’t know what to do” 
(guilty; control group;  14 years old) 
3 Point Descriptions: 
BASIC 
• “I was sad when we had to put my dog down” (sad; autism group; 16 years old) 
• “I am angry at my mom or dad at a time we are disagreeing about something” (angry; 
autism group; 15 years old) 
• “I was afraid when we were on an airplane and it got bumpy” ( afraid; autism group; 16 
years old) 
• “I was nervous when I went to camp for the first time” (nervous; autism group; 15 years 
old) 
• “I was afraid when I first rode a rollercoaster” (afraid; control group; 17 years old) 
• “When I had to play in a band concert and I was in front of the whole school” (nervous; 
control group; 12 years old) 
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SELF-CONSCIOUS  
• “I was proud when I was able to finish very difficult questions very quickly before 
everyone else” (proud; autism group; 16 years old) 
• “When I was young, every time I got scared I had this girly scream, and everyone would 
laugh at me” (embarrassed; autism group; 16 years old) 
• “When I made a speech in class that wasn’t really put in my own words” (guilty; autism 
group; 15 years old) 
• “Mostly when someone points out that my pants are sagging a little lower than I’d like” 
(embarrassed; autism group; 17 years old) 
• “When I took my grandma’s car and I let someone else drive it, and I shouldn’t have” 
(guilty; control group; 16 years old) 
• “When I had to take my younger brother out with me and my friends and he acted 
rudely” (embarrassed; control group; 15 years old) 
 
Specific, Personalized Causes: 
Non-Specific Descriptions: 
• “I’m sad when someone hurts my feelings” (sad; autism group; 16 years old) 
• “I’m nervous during tests” (nervous; autism group; 12 years old) 
• “When I slip and fall in public” (embarrassed, autism group; 17 years old) 
• “When I’ve done good on an assignment” (proud; autism group; 15 years old) 
• “I’m afraid of heights sometimes” (afraid; control group; 14 years old) 
• “Sometimes in school, if you do something bad, you really don't want people to see what 
happened” (embarrassed; control group; 15 years old) 
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Specific Descriptions: 
• “When the Steelers won the Super Bowl” (happy; autism group; 13 years old) 
• “Recently when I found out one of my mentors, my camp director, had passed away. He 
had leukemia” (sad; autism group; 15 years old) 
• “I got proud that I was able to write a script without copying someone else's lines” 
(proud; autism group; 15 years old) 
• “When I broke that orb a few years ago in my front yard” (guilty; autism group; 12 years 
old) 
• “My brother broke my sunglasses and I was angry at him” (angry; control group; 14 
years old) 
• “When my parents are in a store and I do something wrong and they tell me to stop.  
That's embarrassing!” (embarrassed; control group; 16 years old) 
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